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ABSDACT
This study investigates the international adjustment process for
monetary policy in a two-country. two-asset. Walrasian model with
diversified· currency holdings. It is assumed that both countries
consume both commodities. and desire to hold both currencies in order to
maximize a money services function. The investigation of the flexible
exchange rate regime concludes that the relative rate of change of each
currency supply is responsible for determining the rate of change of the
exchange rate and prices. and that the distribution of currencies
between countries is responsible for determining the balance of trade
and the terms o~ trade. The investigation of the fixed'exchange rate
regime demonstrates that even with the gross substitute assumption. a
devaluation will no longer guarantee an improvement in the balance of
trade. and that the terms of trade is influenced by the relative rate of
change of each currency as well as by the exchange rate. The
investigation of the inflationary pressures from a devaluation concludes
that as long as the home country's consumption patterns are highly
sensitive to changes in the exchange rate. then a devaluation will be
more inflationary to the home country in a world with diversified
currency holdings than in a world without diversified currency holdings.
This study shows that regardless of the exchange rate regime. the
introduction of positive cross currency holdings tends to force the
effectiveness of changes in monetary policy on changes in prices.
balance of trade and the terms of trade to yield results that fall
between the traditional flexible exchange rate regime and the
traditional fixed exchange rate regime. In addition. the longrun
analysis concludes that the familiar Monetarist Theorems are appropriate
in explaining longrun monetary adjustment.
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Section 1
I. Introduction to the Economic Problem
~ Statement ~ ~ Problem
There exists extensive literature on the persistent debate between
fixed and flexible exchange rates and their effects on achieving
monetary independence. It is argued that flexible exchange rates can
complete ly insulate a country from changes in foreign monetary
variables. while a fixed exchange rate regime will leave a country
exposed to changes in foreign monetary variables. Much of this debate
is based on the assumption that currencies are perfect ,non-substitutes
in demand. implying that Germans hold only Marks and Frenchmen only
Francs. Therefore. the above argument is dependent only on the degree
of substitutability between currencies on the supply side. resulting
from the imposed exchange rate regime. A fixed exchange rate regime
implies that currencies are perfect substitutes in supply. thus making
the stock of currency in anyone country unmanageable. A flexible
exchange rate regime implies that currencies are perfect nonsubstitutes
in supply. thus making the stock of currency in anyone country
manageable and independent of foreign monetary variables.
Basic elements of this debate are the well-known Monetarist
Theorems and the Purchasing Power Parity Hypothesis both of which were
greatly advanced by the work of Hahn (1959) and Kemp (1970). Their work
has shown that with a flexible exchange rate regime. domestic prices are
influenced only by domestic money creation. and that foreign monetary
expansion will influence the balance of trade to the same degree as a
·1
devaluation or a domestic monetary contraction. The Monetarists also
'argue that the terms of trade can not be influenced by monetary policy.
Recently with the introduction of diversified portfolio holdings of
international currency. the assumption that currencies are perfect
nonsubstitutes in demand has been broken down through the work of Chen
(1973). Girton and Roper (1981). Boyer (1978). Miles (1978a.1978b.1980)
and others. These economists argue that residents of various countries
are compelled to hold a diversified por~folio of foreign currencies in
order to reduce foreseeable exchange rate risk and to minimize future
transactions costs. The emphasis of their work has been to show
empirically that some currencies are close substitutes for each other
with the conclusion that complete monetary independence is impossible.
They state that in effect. a flexible exchange rate regime with
diversified portfolio'holdings of money has, similar properties to that
of the fixed exchange rate regime. Their conclusion is based on the
fact that the substitutability between currencies on the demand side
during a flexible exchange rate regime will counteract the perfect
nonsubstitutability on the supply side. yielding a result similar to the
fixed exchange rate regime.
Most of the work in the area of currency substitution is primarily
concerned with the empirical estimation of the elasticity of
substitution between currencies. Unfortunately. there is very little
research done on the macroeconomic implications of monetary policy with
diversified currency holdings. Since the empirical evidence supports
the notion that currencies are substitutes for one another. and that
this is a relevant economic phenomenon. I propose to investigate the
monetary properties of the balance of trade. terms of trade. exchange
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rate, and inflation using a two country, fixed output. flexible price
model with diversified currency holdings. In effect I will use a
Monetarist Model that is compatible with the models used by Hahn (1959)
and Kemp (1970) in order to investigate the Monetarist Theorems and the
Purchasing Power Parity Hypothesis with diversified currency holdings.
~ Sianifjcance ~ thA Problem
In the context of the existing international economic atmosphere it
seems natural for economic agents to hold part of their wealth in the
form of foreign currencies. Typical agents of this sort include
importers and exporters, international banks, multinational corporations
and tourists. Tourists include those people who frequently travel to
foreign countries for any number of reasons. A typical example would be
those people who live on the border of a foreign country and find it
convenient to shop·-abroad.- It's evident that these people wish to
hold foreign currency as a matter of convenience and to reduce the-shoe
leather- cost of running to the bank. Thus it is widely thought that
these people hold foreign currency for transactionary reasons.
Multinational firms hold foreign currency to help with daily
business transactions. The global corporation may wish to maintain part
of its financial wealth with each local country headquarters to be used
as working capital. Since most local country headquarters hire labor in
local labor markets and borrow financial capital in local financial
markets, they are compelled to pay their bills with the local currency.
Certain governments, France being an example, require foreign firms
that operate in their country to maintain a certain level of cash
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reserves in that country. According to an execut ive of a Fortune 500
firm. construction firms dealing with the French government are forced
to keep all periodic excess revenue in France. The accumulated stock of
excess revenue may be transferred out of France only after the
construction has been completed. and all income taxes have been paid.
Besides the obvious desire to hold foreign currency for the purpose
of arbitrage and speculation. there is also a strong desire to hold
foreign currency for transactionary reasons. The emphasis of this study
is not to directly investigate the motives of holding foreign currency.
but to investigate the implications that the transactionary demand for
foreign currencies have on the international adjustment process.
The significance of this study is most pertinent to poli~y makers
and government leaders of countries whose residents hold a substantial
amount of foreign currency. Likely candidates for this type of country
are those in the European Economic Community and Canada. In 1981.
Canadian residents held nearly 70 billion Canadian dollars in foreign
assets. while they held only 116 billion Canad~an dollars (M2) (Bank of
Canada Review.1982). This is a relatively large foreign to domestic
currency ratio.
An additional interpretation of this study can be directed towards
a small underdeveloped' country compelled to hold a vehicle currency in
order to finance its international expenditures. In 1975. nearly 100 of
the 122 IMF member countries had inconvertible currencies and were
compelled to trade in one of the 11 freely traded convertible currencies
(IMF Annual Report.1975). It has also been argued that the existence of
the Euro-dollar Market and the newly developed Asian-dollar Market
provides further evidence to support this claim.
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II. A lleYiew of Monetary Models
~ Demand fgx Money iA Clgsed Economies
The study of the demand for money is one of the most volatile areas
of research in economics. Researchers are questioning the validity of
the traditional and mainstream approaches for deriving the money demand
equation. Due to the present concern about the proper approach for
modeling the portfolio specification of the macroeconomy and the fact
that most of the theoretical literature has been conducted for the
closed economy. I find it beneficial to review this literature before
proceeding to the analysis for the open economy. Therefore. this review
surveys the literature on the -new microfoundations of money. - a term
used by Kareken and Wallace (1980.p.1). Most of the works reviewed here
were either presented or discussed at the Conference on Models of
Monetary Economics. December 1978. sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis. (Proceedings of this conference can be found in Kareken
and Wallace. 1980).
It is universally held that an essential ~lement in understanding an
individual's behavior is to be aware of the individual's motives and
objectives. This is true for most social sciences and specifically for
"
macroeconomics. To quote Cass and Shell (1980.p.251). -To understand
macroeconomic policy. we must be a~le to explain how the private sector
reacts to government expenditures. taxes and transfers. and money
creation and extinction.- Before the adjustment process of monetary
pOlicy can be determined. it, is required that the role of money in the
economy be accurately described and modelled. As a prerequisite. it is
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necessary to determine and understand the objectives and behavior of
the private sector in the macroeconomy. For this reason. researchers
have turned to the -microfoundations of money.-
It is widely held that current mainstream macroeconomic models.
specifically the IS-LM model. which contains a relatively standard
portfolio specification is vague and can not justify its own existence.
Authors within this framework are guilty of implicit theorizing to
justify their portfolio specifications. Implicit theorizing is defined
as the appeal to an external source to justify the portfolio
specification used in the model. Until recently. the commonly used
asset demand functions were assumed fixed and dependent upon the present
and past values of income. wealth and asset prices.
Implicit theorizing of asset demand functions is usually
accomplished by appealing to either a risk-aversion model or an
inventory model. such as Tobin's (1956.1958). Baumol's (1952). or Miller
and Orr's (1966). Kareken and Wallace (1980.p.2) point out that most
macroeconomic models have implications that contradict those of the
underlying portfolio selection models. Specifically. there is nothing
to guarantee that the yield distributions of assets implied by
macroeconomic models are consistent with the yield distributions implied
by the underlying risk-aversion models. In addition. different policy
regimes in the macroeconomic models imply different yield distributions
for assets. hence contradicting the assumption of a fixed asset demand
function. In addition. Kareken and Wallace (1980.p.3) state that
inventory models and macroeconomic models contradict each other in the
required amount of resources needed for the purpose of transactions.
The former type of model implies that the required amount of resources
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vary. while the latter type of model implies that the required amount of
resources are constant. In conclusion. they argue that these types of
underlying models may be rejected as a sophisticated explanation for the
existence of asset demand functions in modern macroeconomic models.
An alternative means of deriving asset demand functions is placing
a money services function directly into the utility function of the
representative resident of the economy. For an example of this see
Samuelson (1968). An equivalent approach is to create a production
function for money services. as shown by Levhari and Patinkin (1968).
The benefit of this procedure is the relative ease in obtaining asset '.
demand functions that are consistent and econometrically stable.
However. modern monetary economists feel that the richness of the
asset demand functions must include more than just being internally
consistent. Unfortunately. the above procedure relies heavily on
implicit theorizing. where one appeals to a world with stochastic
uncertainty. This explanation describes the role of money in the
utility function as representing future planned consumption. Most
critics reject this approach for it fails to answer crucial economic
questions. Two questions that need answering in this formulation of
economic behavior are: 1. if people have future planned consumption
which is represented by their money holdings. then why are they willing
to accept additional money whenever the money supply increases? 2. to
be consistent with placing money in the utility function to represent
futu~e consumption. aren't we also required to place bonds and
securities in the utility function as well. as they too represent future
consumption? Of course some authors try to eliminate these problems by
initially stating the excess demand functions for money. as examples see
Hahn (1959) and Kemp (1970). The problems caused by this approach are
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similar to those stated above and in addition this approach makes
welfare comparisons impossible.
Models imposing the Clower-constraint (1967. p.5) whereby -money
buys goods and goods buy money. but goods do not buy goods." have
become popular in recent years. These models are driven by the
assumption that economic agents trade with money either because they
are compelled by government regulation or because they wish to minimize
the opportunity cost from an economic obstacle. There are many
variations of this constraint. such as works by Lucas (1980a) and Shubik
(1980). however all imply that the money spent today must have been
earned yesterday.
The main objection voiced against the Clower-constraint. as stated
by Kareken and Wallace (1980). is that the means of payments by economic
agents is given exogenously and not determined by the model. Thus
neither the physical world nor government action will effect the
instrument to be used as the means of payment. Consequent ly. models
which impose a variation of the Clower-constraint eliminate the
possibility of asset substitution.
Currently. researchers are reemphasizing the importance of the
Overlapping Generations Model to determine the demand for money. It has
received overwhelming popularity for its theoretical pureness. and
insights into crucial economic questions. The Overlapping Generations
Model of today is essentially Samuelson's (1958) Pure Consumption Loan
Model.
In Wallace's (1980) Overlapping Generations Model for fiat money.
he stresses two characteristics of fiat money; inconvertibility and
intrinsic uselessness. Based on these characteristics. he builds a two
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period model consisting of two types of workersi young and old. The
theme that motivates this model is that the young generation works hard
in the first period to prepare themselves for retirement in the second
period. During the first period. workers convert their excess output
into money. which they can hold until their retirement years and
convert back into goods. Consequently. the model has the young
generation trading goods for money (savings) and the old generation
trading money into goods (dis savings).
Like all theoretical models. the conclusions reached depend directly
on the initial set of assumptions. The demand for money in the
Overlapping Generations Model is therefore dependent upon the initial
endowments of consumption goods for each economic agent. the rate at
which these goods are stored for future consumption. and individual
consumption desires. The dynamics of this model will simultaneously
determine the implicit demand for money as well as the price of money in
terms of consumption goods.
The success of this model has been attributed to several factors:
it frees the researcher from implicit theorizing. it eliminates the
decision of which assets should appear in the utility function. and
also explains why economic agents can borrow or lend. Kareken and
Wallace (1980.p.7) demonstrate an additional point that. strengthens the
richness of this model through the implication that "outside
indebtedness is welfare-improving because it frees resources that would
otherwise have to be used to provide a stock of commodity money.-
This model also captures the theory of value for money. whereby the
value that I place on money today depends on the value that someone else
will place on money tomorrow. which depends on its value to someone else
the next day. This mechanism depends on the young generation's
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willingness to trade goods for money in order to later trade money for
goods at a future prevailing price. The future prevailing price is
determined by a younger generation's willingness to accept money for
goods. with the objective of later trading money for goods at another
future prevailing price. Therefore the prevailing price tomorrow
depends on the forecasts of the prevailing price for each generation in
the future.
lew economic theories pass without criticism. and the Overlapping
Generations Model is no exception. Below is a summary of the criticism
of the Overlapping Generations Model as stated by Tobin (1980) and
Hurwicz (1980). The basic fundamental assumption that fiat money is
,
used as a medium of exchange is not portrayed in this model. Money does
act as a store of value over time; but this model does not require.money
to be held for the purpose of transactions. One may also ask why
economic agents put their entire trust in one ~sset. Land. capital.
consumption goods and even future contracts act as stores of value and
can be used to deliver goods in the future. In other words. there is no'
reason why one would be willing to hold all of his wealth in the form of
fiat money if the sole purpose is to provide for future consumption.
The above survey concludes that current monetary economic models
are either internally inconsistent. misspecified. or lacking insight.
The larg~st complaint is that these models are attempting to explain a
dynamic phenomenon with static techniques. It is the sentiment of most
monetary economists that a successful monetary model is one that is a
disaggregative dynamic model. which portrays the behavior of individual
residents. Kareken and Wallace (1980.p.9) suggest that a successful
model must also explain valued fiat money. as well as real world
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patterns of transaction velocities. Consequently. one must be aware
that the current discussion between monetary economists is not over
which model best describes the economy. but rather it is to determine
which approach will lead to a well specified model in the future.
~~ Demand~ Money iA~ Economies
This section reviews the techniques used for modeling the demand
for money in open economies. A majority of the techniques used for this
purpose are similar in nature to those used for closed economies. Most
new techniques are introduced in closed economy models before migrating
to open economy models. Fortunately. a substantial number of authors
write in both areas. which tends to minimize the apparent time lag
between the two areas as well as provide consistency in the techniques
used. Since most of the techniques discussed in this section have been
reviewed above. this section will concentrate on the modifications
required to adapt these techniques for the open economy.
Earlier work on the open economy concentrated mainly on the
balance of trade and assumed that capital was immobile. This limited
the scope of the research. but simplified the researcher's work by
allowing him to use the conventional money demand equation. The
conventional money demand equation assumes that the demand curve for
domestic money is inelastic with respect to foreign variables. This
assumption led to the conclusion that changes in foreign mone~ary
variables will not affect domestic variables. However. some researchers
objected to this. stating that real money demand should not be a
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function of just income and domestic prices. They argued that real
money demand should be measured in terms of income and a price index.
where the price index consists of the prices of both domestic and
imported goods. The reasoning for this was that money was being held to
finance the expenditures for both domest ic and imported goods. Kyle
(1976) incorporated the price index into his model for determining real
money demand as well as for real wages. Based on this assumption. his
model for a classical world shares similar characteristics with his
model for a Keynesian world. Specifically. a classical labor market
based on a price index results in an upward sloping aggregate supply
curve.
Recently. through the works of Dornbusch (1973a.1975). Frankel and
Rodriguez (1975). Mussa (1976a.1976b). Kouri (1976) and others. the use
of Portfolio Balances for determining the balance of payments became
widely accepted. Based on the Purchasing Power Parity Hypothesis and
conventional asset demand equations. this avenue of study. currently
known as the Monetary Approach. reached the conclusion that the exchange
rate is determined by the gap between domestic and foreign variables.
This approach has attributed changes in the balance of payments and the
exchange rate to changes in key monetary variables.
Researchers such as Boyer (1978). Abel. Dornbusch. Huizinga. Marcus
(1979). Arango and Nadiri (1981) and Frankel (1980) are working to
extend the Monetary Approach to include the substitution between
domestic and foreign interest bearing assets. It is hypothesized that
bonds are internationally traded. and therefore the domestic demand for
money equation should be rewritten to capture this behavior. To do
this. the money demand equation should be written in terms of domestic
income. domestic and foreign interest rates. price expectations and -the
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exchange rate. These investigators have empirically tested this
relationship and have drawn two contradicting conclusions. First, if
one aSSumes naive expectations, then the substitution between assets
plays a significant role in determining money demand. However, if one
assumes rational expectations, then the substitution between asset.
plays an insignificant role in determining the demand for money.
Another extension of the Monetary Approach is the addition of
internationally held currencies. This topic has been advanced by the
work of Miles (1978a,1978b,1980), Boyer (1978). Girton and Roper (1981)
and King. Putnam and Wilford (1978). The thrust of their works is based
on the fact that residents of each country have the desire to hold not
only their own currency, but that of their neighboring country's as
well. The overwhelming result produced by this work is that a flexible
exchange rate regime shares similar properties with a fixed exchange
rate regime. A majority of this literature is based on either the
conventional asset demand equation or on a variation of the conventional
asset demand equation. Therefore. this work is guilty of implicit
theorizing and is subject to the criticisms stated above. An indepth
review of th1s type of a Currency Substitution Model will be conducted
later in this review.
A variation of the Currency Substitution Model based on the
microfoundation of money demand has been developed by Helpman
. .
(1979,1981), Lucas (1980b) and Stockman (1980). These works motivated a
transaction constraint where individuals are required to finance their
current imports with foreign currency obtained in the past. It is
assumed that a barter exchange is infinitely costly and that all
international transactions are financed in the seller's currency. This
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implies that expenditures during any period must be financed out of the
money held at the beginning of the period. and therefore individuals
find it necessary to hold positive balances of foreign exchange. The
implementation of the transactions constraint yields a demand function
for foreign currency that is dependent on the demand function for
imports. An equilibrium in the currency markets for each country is
established when each country's transactions constraint is satisfied.
The conclusions reached by this work indicate that real supply and
demand side shocks will affect both relative prices and the derived
demand for foreign exchange. and produce the neutrality of money during
a longrun static equilibrium.
Similar to closed economy models. open economy models have the need
to be directed towards the microfoundations for money demand which is
both disaggregative and dynamic. For this reason. Kareken and Wallace
(1978) used the Overlapping Generations Model for determining the
exchange rate and the balance of payments. The purpose of their paper
was to investigate the economic implications of ,different government
policy regimes to control the exchange rate and regulate foreign
currency holdings. As shown in the previous section. the money demand
equation should be free to take on new dimensions dependent upon the
government policy regime. Consequently. Kareken and Wallace (1978)
decided to use the Overlapping Generations Hodel for the open economy.
Their analysis began with an investigation of the consequences of
perfect substitution between fiat currencies and a flexible exchanae
rate regime. They conclude that in the situation of a frictionless
world. the market system will not be able to determine values for the
exchange rate. world wealth. or commodity prices. Their reasoning for
this is that the economy will be in equilibrium regardless of the
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exchange rate. hence the exchange rate is indeterminate. This argument
depends on a frictionless world where different exchange rates imply
different world currency supplies as well as different compositions of
the world currency. In addition. they argue that since fiat money is
assumed to be intrinsically useless. unbacked. and cost less to produce.
then in order to reach any realistic conclusions about the determination
of the exchange rate. one must build frictions into any open economy
model. Typical frictions would be government regulations requiring
residents to hold only domestic currency. or government intervention in
the exchange markets.
Primarily based on the indeterminacy of the exchange rate during a
period of flexible exchaage rates and perfect fiat currency
substitution. Kareken and Wallace (1978) conclude that a free market
exchange rate reform is not feasible. Instead. they suggest alternative
monetary reforms directed towards cooperative and permanent exchange
market inte,rvention or towards controls on asset holdings. In addition
they suggest that another feasible monetary reform. based on
expectations. is to leave market participants guessing or speculating
about future government actions.
Overall. the techniques reviewed for closed economy models parallel
those revie,wed for open economy ~odels. The current direction towards
the importance of the microfoundations of money demand has cast doubt on
the traditional approach to money demand. The dependence between
conclusions and assumptions is clearly shown by a comparison between the
various models. The conventional approach to asset demand implies that
a free monetary reform with flexible exchange rates and free currency
substitution is a feasible policy regime. In contrast. the work by
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Kareken and Wallace (1978) suggests that interventional monetary reform
is the only rational policy regime. Consequently. this review has
touched upon a sensitive issue in the current literature. one that will
probably remain for some time.
~ Monetary Economics ADA Walrasian Models
The common approach to the study of the balance of payments and
exchange rate determination is through the implementation of a
mainstream macroeconomic model. This approach in principle is a general
equilibrium model. which aggregates over sectors of the economy and
contains one of the previously mentioned asset demand specifications.
However. there exists a relatively small number of papers in the current
literature which attempt to investigate the open economy' through the use
of Walrasian type models. The results produced by these models. shown
by Hahn (1959). Kemp (1970). Dornbusch (1973b) and Krueger (1974) are
consistent and supportive of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of
Payments. and are therefore considered as Monetarist models.
In general. Walrasian models modified to include money. follow the
Patinkin formulation for money demand and revise the demand functions
for goods appropriately. The demand equations for money are assumed to
be homogeneous of .degree one in money prices and money wealth. The
demand equations for goods are assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero
in money prices an,d weal the In essence. these models treat money as
another freely traded commodity which is held by residents of the
economy. The price of this money commOdity is usually used as the
numeraire and set to unity.
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The overwhelming advantage of-a Walrasian model in investigating
macroeconomic issues is its simplification of complex mathematical
structures to a relatively small system of equations which makes
analytical solutions both feasible and practical. This allows the
researcher to investigate extensive and difficult models which would
ordinarily be considered impractical. These models are easily extended
to include non-traded goods. which enrich the results with a minimium
amount of effort. Walrasian models are relatively flexible in the way
they can be interpreted. since they are usually stated in terms of
general excess demand equations and are not dependent on anyone
underlying utility function. This allows one to interpret the results
as an explanation for a broad spectrum of situations. Of course this
can help as well as harm the analysis. depending on one's objective.
The results produced by Walrasian models for the open economy
appear in Classical verisons of macroeconomic models as well as in
Monetarist macroeconomic models. The widely accepted results. known as
Kemp's Theorems (Kyle; 1976.p.146). and recently referred to as the
Monetarist Theorems. show the strength of flexible exchange rates in
insulating the home country's monetary variables from foreign monetary
variables. The Purchasing Po~er Parity Hypothesis is a direct result of
this work. An additional result is that the exchange rate and the
balance of trade are determined by the differences between various home
and foreign monetary variables. Due to the appearance of these common
results in various models. some have suggested a re-examination of the
structural similarities and differences between them in order to gain
additional insight into the proper approach to the economic problem. In
oth~r words. it must be more than just a coincidence that seemingly
17
unrelated models produce identical results.
As a result of several strong criticisms. Walrasian models are not
a popular approach to macroeconomic issues. The main argument against
Walrasian models as used to analyze monetary economics is stated by
Clower (1965.1967). Berschleifer (1973) and Leijonhufvud (1968). Their
argument is based on the primary role of fiat money. They claim that
this framework is conceptually inappropriate since Walrasian models are
based on pure barter economies and do not require fiat money to be used
as a medium of exchange. Consequent ly. fiat money has no role.
rendering a Walrasian model inappropriate for monetary economies.
Other claims against the Walrasian approach are stated by the Neo-
Keynes ians.
,
They dislike the implicit tatonnement process that
maintains the model at equilibrium. The tatonnement process eliminates
any disequilibrium adjustment process. which the Neo-Keynesians feel is
the only interesting aspect of monetary economics. Consequently. from
their point of view. the Walrasian model along with other modern
macroeconomic models is inapprop~iate in investigating monetary issues.
Consistent with the above arguments and his notion of monetary
frictions. Wallace (1980) claims that Walrasian models are based on
costless exchange and therefore do not require fiat money. Be argues
(1980. p.50) -that since exchange works perfectly in that model. there
can be no role for a device that is suppose to facilitate exchange.-
Therefore. based on this analysis. one must either reject the Walrasian
model or incorporate some form of friction to justify the existence of
fiat money.
In conclusion. the criticisms stated above are appl,icable not only
to Walrasian models. but also to most mainstream macroeconomic models.
No model can be fully justified from a theoretical point of view. The
18
fact that various models yield identical solutions suggest that there
are many undiscovered similarities between these models. Although one
can argue against the pureness of the Walrasian model. it is hard to
conclude that it is any worse or more misleading than the others. In
all. it rests on the question of a second best solution.
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III. A Review of Currency Substitution IIodela
3Al Macroeconomic Implications
This section concentrates on reviewing Currency Substitution Models
and their implications for the macroeconomy. The literature is
categorized into three sections. The first section is the study of the
determination of the optimal portfolio of international currencies. The
remaining two sections deal with the monetary approach to exchange rate
determination. and are differentiated·by the number of countries used in
the analysis. These sections are guilty of implicit theorizing and are
exposed to the criticisms stated previous lye In effect they adapt the
mainstream portfolio specification to investigate the implications of
currency substitution.
In search of the optimal diversified portfolio of international
currencies to minimize exchange rate risk. Levy and Sarnat (1978)
applied the familiar Tobin-Brainard portfolio selection model. Their
objective was to construct a model. and then during the 1970's simulate
the model to derive the optimally diversified combinations of foreign
currencies. They defined the efficient combination of foreign
currencies to be that which maximizes the mean portfolio rate of return
for a given variance (standard deviation). In order to determine the
risk-return characteristics of exchange rate fluctuations. Levy and
Sarnat (1978) estimated the variance and covariance of the rate of
return earned by a typical American investor from holding international
currencies. The rate of return for each currency in the portfolio is
defined as the percentage increase or decrease of the appropriate
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exchange rat e.
Simulating the model with eight European currencies during the
1970's produced the result that a mixture of these currencies would
indeed significantly reduce the exchange rate risk. Consequently.
assuming that financial markets act rationally. one must construct asset
demand equations to incorporate international monetary variables.
Consistent with the above. King. Putman and Wilford (1978). adapted
the standard monetary approach to exchange rate determination by
including a money services element which captures the services gained by
the holding of domestic and foreign currencies. The allocation of
monetary wealth between currencies depends directly on the degree of
substitutability between these currencies. The elasticity of
substitution is argued to depend on the intensity of integration of
internationally traded goods and capital. Consequent ly. the reduced
form equation for money demand includes real income. the opportunity
cost of holding money. and money services. They conclude that exchange
rate markets become highly sensitive to expected inflation and expected
changes in monetary policy.
Similar to the above exercise. Boyer (1978) modified the standard
money demand equation to include real wealth. which consisted of both
currencies held and both commodity prices. Using a small country
assumption. his model produced results that were consistent with those
obtained by Kareken and Wallace (1978). in that the exchange rate and
prices became indeterminate as currencies became perfect substitutes.
If currencies are nonperfect substitutes. then the monetary variables
are determined and their fluctuations were greatly amplified.
Using a small open economy which holds domestic and foreign
currencies. Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) investigated the determination of
the real exchange rate. Their use of a small open economy implies the
usual assumptions as well as the fact that the rest of the world desires
not to hold the small country's currency. They define the real exchange
rate to be the ratio of the traded good's price to the home good's
price. The demand equation for goods depends on relative prices and
weal the and the composition of monetary weal th between domestic and
foreign currencies depends on the expected difference between the rate
of return for each asset. The assumption of perfect foresight implies
that the expected difference between the rates of return is equal to the
actual exchange rate. Their model concludes that shortrun variations in
the exchange rate depend on monetary variables. and longrun variations
are determined by real variables. In addition. a monetary expansion
will result in an increase in the 'exchange rate that is larger than the
increase in price.
From a microeconomic optimizing framework. Poloz (1981) constructed
a currency substitution model based on Baumol's transactionary demand
for money model. As in Baumol's model. economic agents react to a cash
inventory problem. in which they receive periodic income and face a
continuous rate of consumption. The agent is assumed to spend a
fraction of his income on foreign goods and the rest on domestic goods.
He is also required to purchase foreign goods with foreign currency.
The agent is modelled to face three assets; domestic bonds. domestic
currency and foreign currency. For his convenience. there is a bond
broker and a foreign exchange dealer. each charging a fixed fee per
transaction. Based on this. the economic agent tries to maximize an
objective function which depends on transaction fees. expected rate of
depreciation and the initial holdings of the three assets. One
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limitation of this model is that foreigners are not allowed to hold
domestic currency. The demand equation for domestic money derived from
this model depends on the usual domestic variables as well as on foreign
monetary variables and the expected rate of depreciation. It's
interesting to note. that for certain levels of the expected rate of
depreciation. Baumol's well-known -square-root rule- appears.
Host monetary models investigate the international adjustment
process for small open economies. which eliminates the need to model a
second country. The currency substitution literature has expanded to
tvo country models. allowing for the repercussion· effects of monetary
variables. Using a two country model. Girton and Roper (1981)
constructed an asset demand model for currency substitution by modifying
the money demand equation for each country to include real wealth.
prices of goods. anticipated real returns on each asset. and anticipated
real returns on nonmonetary assets. Using the Purchasing Power Parity
Hypothesis to demonstrate that the exchange rate is determined by the
ratio of the two liquidity preference functions. they derived the
familiar expression for the exchange rate. This expression shows that
the exchange rate is determined by the difference between domest ic and
foreign monetary variables. The results of this model differ from those
produced by other models based on the Purchasing Power Parity Hypothesis
due to the inclusion of foreign monetary variables in the domestic money
demand equation. The conclusions reached here are consistent with other
Currency Substitution Models. in that the exchange rate will experience
large fluctuations from monetary policy. Hence. exchange rate
volatility is associated with currency substitution.
Host models reviewed above are part of the Monetary Approach to
exchange rate determination. They concentrate on the liquidity
preference functions and assume that some interesting monetary variables
are predetermined. An alternative approach to this is to build a
complete macroeconomic model that will simultaneously determine all
monetary variables. The first to build a two country macroeconomic
model to study currency substitution was Chen (1973). Be built a two
country. two commodity. fixed price. Keynesian underemployment model
which contains flow market equilibrium conditions. a balance of payments
equation. and currency preference functions. The currency preference
function for each country relates monetary wealth to the interest rate
and real income. The composition of monetary wealth between the two
currencies is represented by a Cobb-Douglas specification.
Chen conducted monetary and fiscal policy experiments with his
model under three exchange rate and currency substitution regimes. The
first two regimes were with fixed and flexible exchange rates with no
cross currency holdings. Be refers to these as the traditional regimes.
The third regime was with a flexible exchange rate with cross currency
holdings. A comparison of Chen's results for monetary and fiscal pOlicy
under the three regimes concludes that a flexible exchange rate with
cross currency holdings yields an intermediate solution between the two
traditional regimes. SpecificallYe monetary and fiscal policy with
cross c~rrency holdings stimulated the economy by a greater amount than
-the traditional fixed exchange rate regime and by a lesser amount than
the traditional flexible exchange rate regime. In addition. Chen's
model demonstrated that if any foreign currency dominates the
circulation of the domestic currency in the domestic country. the system
will become explosively unstable and may not be able to sustain itself.
Consequently. Cben claims that this provides insight into why small oPen
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economies are compelled to peg their currencies to a strong convertible
currency.
The Currency Substitution Models reviewed above differ from each
other in their structural equations. however they all produce compatible
results. They have suggested that independent monetary policy is
virtually impossible and that perfect substitutabilty among currenci~s
yields an indeterminate solution for the exchange rate and prices. In
addition they have provided an explanation for exhange rate volatility
as well as the highly correlated inflation rates among foreign
countries. These models are guilty of implicit theorizing and lack the
level of technical sophistication of other monetary models.
Consequently. this area of research remains open for future research and
the innovation of new technical techniques.
~ Empirjcal InvestjaatjQns
There have been substantial efforts to empirically estimate the
elasticity of substitution between various internationally traded
currencies. Most of the empirical attempts are based on single country.
models with a diversified portfolio of currencies. Some models
concentrate OD two currency portfolios. while other models use a n-
currency portfolio.
The most widely cited empirical investigation is by Miles (1978a).
Recognizing that Chen's Cobb-Douglas money· demand specifica tion
requires the elasticity of substitution to equal unity. Miles based his
work on a CES production function for money services. The production
function produces money services from the holdings of domestic real
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balances-and foreign real balances. and residents try to maximize these
subject to their asset constraints. The production function reflects
the relative efficiencies of the various currencies. and the asset
constraint- reflects the relative opportunity cost of holding these
various currencies. Applying this formulation to Canada. Miles
empirically estimated the elasticity of substitution between the U.S.
and Canadian dollars held by Canadian residents during the 1960's and
1970's. This time span experienced both a fixed and flexible exchange
rate between the U.S. and Canadian dollar. Miles (1978.p.434) estimated
that the elasticity of substitution was 5.4 for the flexible exchange
rate period. and statistically was significantly different from zero.
The estimate for the fixed exchange rate period was 2.1. and not
statistically significant. Based on this. Miles (1978a.p.436) concludes
that -the concept of substitution between U.S. and Canadian dollars by
private Canadians appears to be statistically valid when the Canadian
government is not performing that service [exchange] for them.-
Husted (1981) reformed and expanded Miles' currency substitution
model and retested the Canadian data for the same time perio~ Husted
constructed a model that minimized the holding costs of currency subject
to a desired level of production services. The model incorporated a
transactions demand for money. whereby currency substitution is not only
dependent on the relative holding costs. but also on the level of
economic activity. In addition. Rusted allows the expected rate of
change in the exchange rate to effect the substitutability between
currencies. His empirical results produced a statistically
insignificant estimate for the elasticity of substitution. Based on
this. Husted (1981.p.32) claims that -the degree of substitutability
falls nearly to zero. Hence ••••foreign monies are not substitutes for
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domestic balances•••-
Not satisfied with the single country. two asset empirical models.
Brillembourg and Schadler (1979) constructed a Brainard-Tobin portfolio
allocation model for several currencies. Using a full-information.
maximum-likelihood estimation technique to estimate the demand equations
for eight internationally traded currencies between·1973-l978.
Brillembourg and Schadler (1979) found that currencies were both
complements and substitutes for each other. They stated that
(1979.p.533) -close complementarity among continental European
currencies is found. while the U.S. dollar tends to be a substitute for
these currencies.- Consequent ly. they stress the importance of
\
complementarity and substitutability on the demand for currencies. and
argue that a third currency effect must ·be incorporated into any .model
for exchange rate determination.
In this light. Miles (1980) attempted a more rigorous test of his
theory by extending his model to a multicurrency framework. Using a
similar money services function as in his earlier work. Miles estimated
the elasticity of substitution between the U.S. dollar and other foreign
currencies held by u.S. residents. Likewise for Germany. he estimated
the elasticity of substitution between the Mark and other foreign
currencies. Estimates for the flexible exchange rate regime during the
early seventies produced an average elasticity of substitution of 3.71
in the U.S.. and an average of 2.78 in Germany. Estimates for the fixed
exchange rate regime for the U.S. during the late sixties produced an
average elasticity of 2.67. Consequently. Miles claims that these
results support the initial conclusions reached from his Canadian study.
Dissatisfied with Miles' CES production function and the
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restrictions that are imposed on the possible estimated values for the
elasticities. Sims (1980) created an alternative cost minimizing
function for n-currencies. Assuming that residents for each country
minimize the rental costs of currency with respect to a desired level
of real services. currency demand functions were derived. Imposing a
translog specification for estimation. Sims estimated the elasticity of
substitution for five leading internationally traded currencies.
Although not all of his estimated values were statistically significant.
they did imply that foreign currencies were complements to one another
and all were substitutes for the u.S. dollar. This result is consistent
with that obtained by Brillembourg and Schadler (1979). Based on his
empirical works. Sims (1980.p.13) speculates that -there may be only
two currencies: one composite currency (made up of foreign currencies)
and the U.S. dollar.-
In summary. the empirical investigations reviewed above suggest
that there is strong disagreement on the proper asset specification and
on the approach used to estimate the elasticity of substitution.
However. disregarding the precise estimated value of the elasticity of
substitution. there does seem to be substantial evidence to support the
claim that currency demand equations are interrelated and that
international monetary variables tend to move together. This evidence
also provides additional support to the conclusions reached above.
specifically that the existence of currency substitution tends to link
the major financial capitals of the world. In addition. the n-currency
studies demonstrate the broad spectrum of the problem and the many
elements that are involved. Although currency substitution exists from
a theoretical and empirical basis. it still remains to be seen' if there
is any practical importance from a policy standpoint.
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SBCTIOR 2
IV. Hethodology
~ Iha Demand !Ax Money
The results obtained from any monetary model are directly dependent
on the asset demand specification used in formulating the model. The
review preceding clearly demonstrates this point and discusses the
controversial debate over the appropriate method for deriving asset
demand equations. The widely accepted conclusion stated above is that
no asset specification is completely satisfactory. In other words. no
matter which specification is used for macroeconomic model building.
there will always be some limitation to the approach and the results.
In determining the appropriate set of assumptions for money demand.
it has been argued that economic agents follow a two step procedure in
determining the composition of their portfolio of international
currencies (Girton.1981). Initially. economic agents independently
determine the total amount of resources required for both speculative
and trans8ctionary purposes. Secondly. within each of the speculative
and transaction8ry demands for money. economic agent s determine the
composition of the currencies held to meet these demands. In other
words. one may investigate the demand for domestic and foreign
currencies used for trans8ctionary purposes separately from those
currencies held for speculative purposes. To test if this procedure is
correct is beyond the scope of this paper. Assuming that this procedure
is correct. it- allows a researcher to concentrate on one or both areas
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independently.
A close look at the world economy and international trade
demonstrates that tourists. importers and exporters. multinational firms
and underdeveloped countries hold substantial amounts of foreign
currency to finance their internatio~al expenditures. Based on this
behavior. this paper will concentrate on the tranaactionary demand for
money. This restriction will obviously shorten the scope of the paper.
but certainly by no more than any other monetary model.
To capture the transactionary demand for domestic and foreign
currencies. this paper will take advantage of the technique of placing a
·money services function in the utility function for each economic agent.
\
"Money" and ·currency· will be used interchangeably throughout this
paper. since there is no need to distinguish between deposits and
currency. The money services function is assumed to be homogeneous of
degree zero in money wealth and prices. which represents real balances.
This is an attempt to model the behavior of economic agents' willingness
to hold domestic money to finance their future domestic consumption and
\J. ;U
their willingness to hold foreign money to finance their future
consumption of imported goods. Although this technique does not
explicitly show this behavior. it does represent the general atmosphere.
One should be aware that the results obtained from this model are done
so with the understanding that money is not held for its own sake. but
for the purpose of future consumption. The benefits of this procedure
are concise asset demand equations and the fact that the model will be
internally consistent.
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~ A Halrasian Approach
Any two country. two commodity. two asset model that investigates
the international adjustment process runs the risk of becoming large and
unmanageable. For this reason. a Halrasian model is used in this paper
to minimize complications and to keep the mathematics within reason.
The criticisms stated above concerning Walrasian models also apply to
most macroeconomic models. thus implying that a theoretically flawless
monetary model is virtually unobtainable at the present time. This
investigation is a first attempt to analyze this complex situation. and
\
therefore should be considered as a first approximation of the problem.
It will certainly not be the last paper written on the subject. however
it should capture the basic intuition of the situation and act as a
catalyst for future research.
The other reason for using a Halrasian model is to obtain
comparable results with those produced by Hahn (1959) and Kemp (1970).
The comparison of these results should aid in providing further insight
into how the substitutability of currency changes. and influences the
international adjustment process.
The mechanics of the model show that'the maximization of the
utility functions with respect to the appropriate budget constraint will
yield demand equations for both goods and money. The demand equations
combined with the equilibrium conditions produce excess demand equations I
for both goods and money that are compatible with one another.
Consequently. the substitutability among currencies is not the result of
any speculative motive or exchange rate risk. but is a result of the
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budget constraints. Whereby. from any equilibrium position. the
accumulation of any currency by an individual economic agent is at the
expense of the other currency held by that individual.
~ Indeterminacy ~ ~ Exchan&e~
Kareken and Wallace (1978). and Wallace (1979). have argued that a
flexible exchange rate regime with perfect currency substitutability
yields an indeterminate exchange rate. This paper differs from their
work in the assumption that currencies are non-perfect substitutes in
demand. This assumption is based on the implicit institutional
constraints imposed on economic agents. Typical institutional
constraints are government taxation and spending. and the requirement
that foreign firms are' compelled to maintain all excess revenues in the
domestic country. As long as the government requires that all taxes and
government contracts be paid with domestic currency. residents are
-compelled to hold at least a certain minimum level of domestic currency.
Consequently. currencies can not be perfect substitutes of demand.
The implication of this assumption is that the currency
substitution model is workable and will determine both domestic and
foreign variables. In addition. this assumption also makes it
reasonable to assume that economic agents will have the desire to hold
foreign currencies during a fixed exchange rate regime. where currencies
are perfect substitutes of supply.
The Kareken and Wallace (1978) model concludes that explicit
government exchange regulations are necessary in order to est"ablish a
stable system. The model stated in this paper does not imply such
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restrictions since the implicit institutional constraints imply that
currencies are non-perfect substitutes of demand. thus yielding
solutions for monetary variables.
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V. The Shortrun Currency Substitution Model
To investigate the robustness of the Monetarist Theorems with
diversified currency holdings. I will use a two country. two commodity.
general equilibrium model with fixed output and flexible prices. It is
assumed that each country specializes in the production of its own
commodity (national income) and currency. The assumption that output is
fixed does not substantially restrict the qualitative results of the
model. This model writes the excess demand equations for goods in terms
of prices and money wealth. If output is flexible. the excess demand
equations would still be written in terms of prices and money wealth.
where a change in price would represent a change in both supply and
demand. Therefore the qualitative results produced here are similar in
nature to those produced by a standard two sector. variable output
model.
~ Constrained Maximization
The portfolio behavior of diversified currency holdings specified
above is modelled by placing a money servic~s element directly into the
utility function for each economic agent. Although there are other ways
to model this behavior. as previously mentioned. each method has its own
limitations. With respect to 'placing M in U'. Samuelson (1968.p.8)
states. "This present overs imp lified vers ion does suffice to give the
correct general picture."
In light of the above it is assumed that each country tries to
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maximize its own ut ility:
( 1)
( 2)
These equations state that agent j gains utility from the consumption of
both commodities (Xlj' X2j) and from money services produced by the
holding of the two currencies (M I -. M2 -). The function (h-) is assumedJ J J
to be homogeneous of degree zero in order to capture the real balance
effect. Each good has its own price (Pl' P2) measured in its own
currency. The exchange rate (e) represents the value of the second
country's currency in terms of the first country's currency. In other
words. the exchange rate (e) converts values in country two's currency
into values in country one's currency.
For simplicity. the utility functions can be written as:
which is assumed to be twice continuous differentiable and has non-
infinite derivatives. The maximization of this equation with respect to
its budget constraint will produce demand equations that are well
behaved.
The maximization of each country's utility is constrained by its
respective budget:
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(3)
(4)
Equation (3) states that for the first country the value of consumption
of the two commodities (PIXll+eP2X2I) and the end of the period holdings
of the two currencies (MII+eM2l) must be equal to or less than the value
,
of their production income (PIXl) and the initial holdings (endowments)
of the two currencies (MiI+eM~I)' all measured in terms of the first
currency. Equation (4) states analogous information for the second
country.
The notation can be summarized by the following:
Xl = Country one's output of the first commodity
X2 = Country two's output of the second commodity
X·· =Country j's consumption of country i's commodity1J
Mij = Country j's demand for country i's currency
Mf:. =Country j's initial holdings of country i's currency1J
PI = price of country one's commodity valued in country one's
currency
P2 = price of country two's commodity valued in country two's
currency
e = exchange rate. value of the second country's currency in terms
of the first country's currency.
MW1 = MIl + eM2I
MW2 = M12 + eM22
(nominal money wealth for country one)
(nominal money wealth for country two)
In a competitive world consumers maximize equations (1) and (2)
3·6
subject to equations (3) and (4) taking prices and the exchange rate as
parameters. The maximization procedure yields demand equations for both
money and goods that depend upon money income. money prices and the
stock of money. However. since money income depends upon money prices.
the demand equations may be written solely in terms of money prices and
the stock of money.
XII = XII (PI' eP2' M~I + eM;l)
X21 = X21 ( ) (5)
MIl = Mll ( )
eM2I = M2I( )
X22 = X22 (PI , eP2' eM;2 + M~2) (6)
Xl2 = X12( )
eM22 = M22 ( )
M12 M12( )
These demand equations are assumed to be well behaved and
compatible with Patinkin's formulation for demand equations. in that the
demand equations for goods are assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero
in money prices and money wealth. and the demand equations for money are
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in money prices and money
wealth. In addition. the following four assumptions are used throughout
this study.
(i) All commodities are (weak) gross substitutes for each other:
P. dX ..] =~ > 0X.. ""p~J a.
J
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(i #j)
For all i,j
(ii) Commodities are gross substitutes for money:
P. aM ..
~ =~> 0 For all i ,jM••
~J ap.1.
(iii) The marginal propensities to consume are positive:
I. ax ..
X.~ =~ > 0
1J 0aMij
(iv) The marginal propensity to hoard currency is positive:
I. aH ..
M.~=~>O Foralli,j
~J 0aMij
The inclusion of the gross substitute assumption for money and
goods provides the structure to guarantee all the standard results that
are ne c e s sa r y for the de t er mina cy 0 f the mod e 1. In 0 ther w0 r ds. t his
model is structured in a way that is compatible with the models by Hahn
(1959) and Kemp(1970). The assumption that commodities are gross
substitutes for money demonstrates that in order to minimize the
decrease in money services. a country will hoard money whenever prices
increase.
~ Rorld Excess Demand Equations
The equilibrium conditions for the model are:
Xl = XII + Xl2 ( 7)
(8)
(9)
(10)eM;2 + eM;1 = eM22 + eM2I
Equations (7) and (8) require that the demand and supply for
commodities are equal. and equations (9) and (10) require that the
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(11)
demand and supply for each currency is equal. The summation of the two
budget constraints yield the world's budget constraint as well as the
implication of Walras' Law.
+ (eM;Z+eM;1-eMZZ-eMZ1) = 0
By imposing Walras' Law and substituting the demand equations (5)
and (6) into the equilibrium conditions (7). (8) and (9). the following
three equation system will result. The system is written in terms of
the first currency.
Xl = X11(Pl,ePz,M~1+eM;1) + X1Z(P1,ePz,eM;z+M~z) (lZ)
X
z
= XZ1 ( ) + XZZ ( ) (13)
Mil + Miz = Mll( ) + M1Z ( ) (14)
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VI The Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
This section investigates the determination of the exchange rate.
prices. balance of trade. and the terms of trade under a flexible
exchange rate regime. Equations (12) through (14) are rewritten in .
terms of percentage changes (denoted by A ) which can be solved for
three unknowns (PI- P2- ;).
(12.1)
(13.1)
(14.1)
•
The homogeneity properties of the demand equations imply further
restrictions on the model:
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PI ePZ I I0 I 0 0 Zoo= Xl PI + Xl eP Z + XII (MII+eMZI) + XI2(eMZZ+MIZ)
PI ePZ I Il( 0 0) Z( 0 0)a Xz PI + Xz ePz + XZI MII+eMZI + XZ2 eMzz+M12
PI ePz I I0 0 1 0 0 Zoo
MIl + MIZ = M1 PI + MI ePz + M11(MII+eMZ1) + M1Z(eMZZ+M1Z)
For simplicity the notation represents:
P. P. P.
X. J = J J~ XiI + Xi2
(lZ . 2)
(13.2)
(14.Z)
P.
M J =
i
P. P.
J JMil + Mi2
(For all i,j)
The following propositions can be deduced from equations (12.1) through
(14.1) in compliance with the restrictions of (12.2) through (14.2).
~ Exchanze~
PROPOSITION LL Regardless of who holds the currency. the direction of
change of the exchange rate is solely dependent upon the relative rate
of change of the two currencies. Furthermore. if there are cross
currency holdings. then a proportionate change in any Mij will cause a
less than proportionate change in the exchange rate.
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where:
> 0
> 0
Proof: See Appendix A
A proportionate increase in any M1j initially creates excess supply
for the first currency along with an increase in the monetary wealth of
country j. The increase in the monetary wealth of country j increases
the demand for the first currency along with creating excess demand for
the second currency. This situation causes the exchange rate to
increase in order to: 1. stimulate additional demand for the first
currency. and 2. reduce the excess demand for the second currency. The
required change in the exchange rate is less than the proportionate
increase in H'ij due to the initial increase in the monetary wealth of
'country j. which is partially hoarded and not used for consumption.
o
Likewise. a proportionate increase in M2j will cause excess supply
for the second currency along with an increase in the monetary wealth of
country j. The increase in the monetary wealth of country j begins to
reduce the excess supply for the second currency along with creating
excess demand for the first currency. Therefore the exchange rate is
forced down in order to stimulate demand for the second currency. as
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well as to reduce the demand for the first currency. Both markets are
brought back to equilibrium with a less than proportionate change in the
exchange rate due to the initial increase in the monetary wealth of
country j.
Further investigation into the elasticities between the exchange
rate and money holdings display additional insights into the model. The
'" "'0
elasticity between e and Mll(~l) as expressed above depends upon the
marginal propensities to hoard the second currency for both countries.
If the first country desires to hoard more of the second currency in
relation to its monetary wealth the elasticity ct>I will increase. The
I 1 '" 0increase in M2l as MIl increases will create addit ions1 excess demand
for the second currency. The additional demand for the second currency
requires an additional increase in the exchange rate in order to restore
equilibrium in the currency markets. In other words. any increase in the
demand to hoard currency is not met by an increase in currency hoarding.
but rather by a change in the exchange rate which eliminates the new
demand.
I 2 "0
In contrast to the above. an increase in M22 as MIl increases will
cause the elasticity cPl. to decrease. An increase in M~~ implies that
the second country's currency hoarding behavior is more sensitive to its
"'0
monetary wealth than before. An increase in MIl creates excess supply
for the first currency and excess demand fOT the second cUTrency. This
~ituation will force the exchange rate to rise in order to establish a
new equilibrium for the currency markets. Since the second country's
currency hoarding behavior is sensitive to the exchange rate. the
required rise in the exchange rate is now smaller than it was before.
This is due to the rapid fall in the demand for the second currency by
the second country.
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Equation (15) demonstrates the fact that the exchange rate
e last ic it ies corresponding to MIl and 'M°12 vary inverse lye Therefore
II 12 "'0
changes in M21 and M22 will effect the elasticity for M12 in an opposite
manner than the elasticity for ~11. Equation (15) also demonstrates a
similar relationship between the exchange rate elasticities for M~2 and
"0
M2l with respect to the marginal propensities to hoard the first
currency for both countries. The adjustment processes for these cases
are identical to that shown above.
In the standard Monetarist Model. there are no cross currency
holdings. in which case equation (15) implies that <P1:1. Introducing
positive cross currency holdings reduces ¢ 1 below one. At first this
may seem to contradict the conclusions reached above. One must recall
that in this model the monetary supplies are exogenous. Therefore. any
excess demand for currency is met by a change in the exchange rate and
not by a flow of currency. However. one may extrapolate from this model
and assume that over time excess demand for currencies will be met by a
flow of currencies and eventually increase the stock holdings of
currencies. This technique combined with equation (15) demonstrates
that <PI will fall as country two begins to hold the first currency.
This extrapolation is consistent with the basic Monetarist Model.
If there occurs an equi-proportionate change in all M~j'S and M~j'S
",0 ° ° "0 "'0 " °
such that M1* : MIl : M12 and M2* : M22 : M21 then equation (15)
becomes:
(16)
If all holders of Mi increased their holdings by the same
proportion. the familiar exchange rate determination equation will
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result. Thus. one may conclude that the Monetarist Theorem for exchange
rate determination is a special case of the Currency Substitution Model.
~ Prices
~UfQ~U~ 2L Provided there are cross currency holdings. a
proportionate increase in currency i will lead to a less than
proportionate increase in the price level i and will have an
indeterminate effect on the price level j. Furthermore the
indeterminate change !It the price level j depends on the sensitivity of
the exchange rate to changes in the supply of each currency.
where:
where:
WIM~l + Wl~leM;l + W2~leM;2
liP!
o 0
W1¢2eM21 - W2(1-¢2)eM22
~Pl
(l-¢l)nlM~l - ~ln2Mi2
~eP2
> 0
(171
(18)
Y2 =
000~2Mllnl + n2(eM22 + ¢2M12)
6eP2
> 0
Proof: See Appendix B
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"0
A proportionate increase MIl will increase the first country's
monetary wealth by less than a proportionate amount since each country
holds both currencies. The.increase in monetary wealth will create
excess demand for the first good and excess supply for the first
currency. The excess supply for the first currency will force the
exchange rate to rise by a less than proportionate amount in order to
stimulate demand to bring the currency market into equilibrium. The
increase in the exchange rate increases the monetary wealth of both
countries, thus creating additional demand for the first good. Since
the proportionate increase Mil stimulted a less than proportionate
increase in the demand for the first good, PI is required to increase by
a less than proportionate amount to reduce the demand and bring the
market into equilibrium. The adjustment process for PI resulting from
an increase ;~2 is similar to the above.
"0
For changes in P2, a proportionate increase M22 will increase the
second country's monetary wealth by a less than proportionate amount,
which creates excess supply for the second currency and excess demand
for the second good. In order to stimulate demand for the second
currency, the exchange rate will fall and reduce the monetary wealth of
both countries. This leads to a reduction in the increased demand for
the second good. Thus, a less than proportionate increase P2 is required
in order to obtain an equilibrium in the market for the second good. A
A 1".0
similar relationship exists between P2 and M21 •
It was stated above that the elasticities between currency i and
the price level j are ambiguous in sign. The ambiguity results from the
counteracting forces which developed in the model as a result of changes
A 1".0
in the exchange rate. Consider the elasticity between Pl and M22 (82) as
A
shown above. An increase M22 will create excess supply for the second
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currency as well as increase the monetary wealth of the second country.
The increase in the monetary wealth of the second country will partially
reduce the excess supply for the second currency. create excess demand
for the first currency. and create excess demand for both goods. The
excess supply for the second currency along with the excess demand for
the first currency'will cause the exchange rate to decrease in order to
maintain an equilibrium for both currency markets. The decrease in the
exchange rate will partially offset the increase in the monetary wealth
of the second country as well as cause a decrease in the first country's
monetary wealth. Therefore the first country will demand less of both
goods. while the second country's inc~ease in demand for both goods will
only be slightly reduced. As a result. the price of the second good has
increased. However since the exchange rate decreased. the direction of
change in the price of the second good measured in the first currency
"0
(eP2) is ambiguous. The overall effect on PI from an increase M22 can
be decomposed into three counteracting forces in the economy. which are
shown by the following expression:
First. there is a decline in demand for the first good due to a wealth
effect for the first country caused by the decline in the exchange rate.
Second. there is an increase in the demand for the first good due to the
"0
wealth effect for the second country caused by an increase M22• Third.
there is an ambiguous substitution effect between the two goods due to
an ambiguous change in the price of the second good measured in terms of
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the first currency.
AO
The sensitivity of the exchange rate to changes in M22 is the
A
significant element in determining the sign of the elasticity between PI
A 0
and M22• If the exchange rate is relatively insensitive to an increase
A 0
M22' then the decrease in the monetary wealth of the first country will
be minimized and one will observe an increase in eP2• Consequently the
increase in the second countrTs monetary wealth will then dominate, and
create excess demand for the first good. This results in an increase in
PI which is necessary to maintain an equilibrium in the market for the
first good. If the exchange rate is relatively sensitive to an increase
AO
M22' then the decrease in the first country's monetary wealth along with
a decrease in eP2 will dominate, causing excess supply for the first
good. This results in a decline in PI which maintains an equilibrium in
the market for the first good.
The elements determining the sensitivity of the exchange rate to
~ 12
changes in M22 was discussed in Proposition 1. It was shown that as M12
11increased and MIl decreased then ¢ 2 would increase. The significance of
these elements is demonstrated in the following equation: .
(20)
determining the direction of change of Pl. These elements, referred to
as the "crucial ratios" by Hahn (1959) are not uncommon in both monetary
and non-monetary models. They appear in the investigations of the
adjustment process for transfers, as in the work of Samuelson (1952).
and Hahn (1959). They show the consumption preferences for each country
for both goods. The normal case occurs when each country prefers
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II 12 12 IIdomestic goods to imported goods thus. XIIX22-XI2X21>O. This implies
that a change in country j's monetary wealth will have a significant
role in determining the direction of change in the price of good j.
The equation above demonstrates that as long as each country
I
prefers its domestic good to the imported good. and if M1i is relatively12
small and M12 relatively large. then the exchange rate will be highly
"""0
sensitive to changes in M22•
'") 0
In this case an increase M22 will cause PI
to decline. However if each country has perverse preferences such that
II
they prefer the other country's good over their own. and if MIl is
I
relatively large and MI~ relatively small then the exchange rate will be
'" 0 '" 0
highly insensitive to changes in M22 • Therefore an increase M22 will
'"cause PI to increase.
'" 0The characteristics of the elasticity between PI and M21 yield
"'0
similar results as those found above. An increase M21 will increase the
first country's monetary wealth. decrease that of the second country and
cause an ambiguous change in eP2. The overall effect on the direction
'"
of ch~nge of PI is'again ambiguous. The sensitivity of the exchange rate
o
to a change in M21 is the significant element in determining the
direction of change of Pl.
The sign of the elasticities between P2 and MIl and Ml2 depends
upon similar counteracting forces in the model caused by changes in the
exchange rate. For these cases. equation (B.7) shows that the
sensitivity of the exchange rate is influenced by the marginal
propensities to hoard the second currency by both countries. In order
'" "'0 •for the elasticity between P2 and MIl to be negat1ve. the exchange rate
• "'0 . 0
must be highly sensitive to increases 1n MIl. An increase in MIl and
the subsequent increase in the exchange rate will increase the monetary
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wealth of both countries. However the exchange rate will have an
overwhelming price effect for the second good causing a decline in
demand. Consequently P2 is forced to decline in order to stimulate
enough demand to bring the market back to equilibrium. This situation
I I
will occur whenever M2i is relatively large and M2~ is relatively small.
The investigation of the relationship between the marginal
propensities to hoard currency and the elasticities for inflation will
yield additional insights into the model. The elasticity between PI and
A 0 11
MIl as shown above demonstrates that as M21 increases <p 1 will increase.I
thus forcing 8 1 to increase. The increase in M2i creates additional
demand for ~he second currency requiring an additional increase in the
exchange rate in order to bring the currency market back into
equilibrium. The additional increase in the exchange rate will cause an
additional increase in the monetary wealth of the two countries. This
increase in monetary weal th will further increase the demand for the
first good. requiring PI to rise by an additional amount in order to
eliminate the additional demand.
12The elasticity 81 also demonstrates that an increase in M22 will12
, cause <PI to decrease. thus causing 81 to decrease. The increase in M22
requires a small rise in the exchange rate to bring the currency market
back to equilibrium. This causes the monetary wealth for the two
countries to increase by a smaller amount than before. thus causing the
demand for the first good to increase less than before. Therefore PI is
required to increase by a smaller amount due to the smaller increase in
demand. The above expression for 8 1 also demonstrates similar
relationships for the marginal propensities to hoard the first currency
by both countries.
o
Suppose that all holders of Mi increased their holdings by the same
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"'0 '" 0 '" 0 "'0 "'0 A 0
proportion. such that Ml *=Mll=M1 2 and M2*=M2l=M22. Then equations (17)
and (18) yield the following familiar results.
'"
~
PI P2
= = I
"'0 '"
MI * M;*
A
'"PI P2
a= =~o
"'0
M2* M1*
(21 )
(22)
These results also indicate that the Monetarist Theorems are a special
case of the Currency Substitution Model.
~ Balance ~ Trade
With the aid of Walras' Law and the world budget constraint. the
investigation of the balance of trade between the two countries may be
focused on either of the two country's budget constraints. The balance
of trade for the first country is defined to be the difference between
the value of production income (PlXl ) and the value of the commodities
consumed (PlXll+eP2X21). Rewriting equation (3) yields:
B ( 23)
The budget constraint for the first country states that the value of
excess supply for commodities is equal to the value of excess demand for
monies. which implies that a country may alter its level of foreign or
domestic currency holdings through an excess supply or demand for
commodities. The budget constraint also demonstrates that from any
stock position one might well have a planned acquisition of assets thus
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implying that a flexible exchange rate can not guarantee a balance of
trade equal to zero.
Therefore the investigation into the direction of change of the
balance of trade from increases in the money supplies may be conducted
using the equation for the value of excess demand for monies. The
balance of trade (B) is initially assumed to be equal to zero.
(24)
Substituting the demand equations for MIl and M21 from the set of
equations (5) into equation (24) yields:
The homogeneity restriction implied by equation (25) is:
o := (26)
The following proposition can be deduced from equations (24). (25) and
(26) •
PROPOSITION 1: The direction of change of the balance of trade is
dependent upon the relative rate of change of the monetary wealth for
o
each country. Furthermore. an equi-proportionate decrease in Mil or
increase in Mi2 will improve the balance of trade for the first country
by the same magnitude.
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Where:
Proof: See Appendix C
Equation (27)" states that an increase in the monetary wealth of the
first country from an increase in either currency will lead to a balance
of trade deficit for the first country. An increase in the monetary
wealth of the second country "from an increase in either currency will
lead to a balance of trade surplus for the first country.
The standard Monetarist Model with no cross currency holdings and a
flexible exchange rate. shows that the balance of trade will remain
unchanged from a change in any money stock. Introducing positive cross
holdings of currency during a flexible exchange rate regime. results in
a balance of trade that can no longer be guaranteed to remain unchanged
from a change in any money stock. This result is caused by the
adjustment process of the exchange rate which is attempting to maintain
a zero world excess demand for both currencies.
The exchange rate adjusts according to the world excess demand for
both currencies. Rewriting equations (9) and (10) shows:
(9.1)
(10.1)
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However. the exchange rate is not responsible for maintaining a zero
excess demand for currency i in country j. The implication of this can
"0
be seen by investigating the adjustment process from an increase M..•1J
"0
A proportionate increase MIl will ~ead to an excess supply for the
first currency held by the first country and create world excess supply
for the first currency. The increase in the monetary wealth of the
first country creates excess demand for the second currency held by the
, first country and creates world excess demand for the second currency.
This situation leads to a less than proportionate increase in both the
price of the first good and the exchange rate. This begins to create
excess demand for the first currency held by the second country and
excess supply of the second currency held by the second country.
Therefore. there exists excess supply for the first currency held by the
first country. excess demand for the first currency held by the second
country. and zero world excess demand for the first currency. At the
same time there exists excess demand for the second currency held by the
first country. excess supply of the second currency held by the second
country. and zero world excess demand for the second currency. The
homogeneity conditions show that the excess supply of the first currency
held by the first country dominates the excess demand for the second
,,0
currency held by the first country. Consequently. the increase MIl
results in a balance of trade deficit for the first country and a
balance of trade surplus for the second country.
In contrast to the above. if the first country's monetary wealth
''0
increased as a result of an increase M2l • then there will be excess
supply for the second currency held by the first country as well as
world excess supply for the second currency. The increase in the
monetary wealth of the first country will create excess demand for the
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first currency held by the first country. and create world excess demand
for the first currency. This situation causes the exchange rate to
decline by a less than proportionate amount. resulting in excess supply
for the first currency held by the second country and excess demand for
the second currency held by the second country. Therefore. there exists
excess supply of the second currency held by the first country. excess
demand for the second currency held by the second country. and zero
world excess demand for the second currency. At the same time there
exists excess demand for the first currency held by the first country.
excess supply of the first currency held by the second country. and zero
world excess demand for the first currency. The homogeneity conditions
show that the excess supply of the second currency held by the first
country dominates the excess demand for the first currency held by the
""0
first country. Consequent ly. the increase M21 results in a balance of
trade deficit for the first country and a balance of trade surplus for
the second country.
If the second country's monetary wealth increased due to an
increase in either currency. then the opposite adjustment process will
""0
occur. An increase M12 will result in excess supply for the first
currency held by the second country. and excess demand for the second
currency held by the second country. where the former dominates the
latter. There will also be excess demand for the first currency held by
the first country. and excess supply for the second currency held by the
first country. where the former dominates the latter. Consequently.
there will be a balance of trade surplus for the first country and a
"" 0balance of trade deficit for the second country. An increase M22 will
result in an excess supply of the second currency held by the second
5S
country which dominates the excess demand for the first currency held by
the second country. Therefore. there will be a balance of trade surplus
for the first country and a balance of trade deficit for the second
country.
"0 A O
The reason that an equi-proportionate decrease Mil or increase Mi2
.impro~es the balance of -trade for the first country by the same
magnitude. is due to the homogeneity conditions as well as to the
"'0 "0
symmetry of the model for changes in Mil and Mi2. The symmetric
"'0 "'0
behavior of the model for changes in Mil and Mi2 is shown in the first
two propositions.
o
If all holders of Hi increased their holdings by the _same
"0' "0 A O "'0 "0 "'0 h )proportion such that Ml*=MII=MI2 and M2*=M2l=M22 t en equation (27
would produce:
(28)
This condition yields the conclusions reached by the basic
Monetarist Model. in that monetary variables will not influence the
balance of trade. A proportionate increase
A 0
M1* will cause
" "proport iona te increases in both PI and e. such that the excess supp ly
A Ofor M1* will be exactly offset. Consequently the balance of ~rade
remains unchanged.
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~ Terms II Trade
PROPOSITION i: An increase in the monetary wealth of the first country
will deteriorate (improve) the terms of trade for the first country as
long as each country prefers -domestic (imported) goods to imported
(domestic) goods. An increase in the monetary wealth of the second
country will improve (deteriorate) the terms of trade for the first
country as long as each country prefers domestic (imported) goods to
imported (domestic) goods. oFurthermore a proportionate increase in Mil
or decrease in Mi2 will deteriorate the terms of trade for the first
country by a less than proportionate amount.
where:
Proof: See Appendix D
The dependence of this result on the ratio of the marginal
propensities to consume both goods by both countries as shown above is
not uncommon. These "crucial ratios" appeared when the direction of
change in the price level from an increase in the money supply was
investigated. Consequently one would expect them to reappear in the
investigation of the terms of trade.
If each country prefers to consume its domestic good over an
imported good. then an increase in country j's monetary wealth due to an
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increase in either currency will create excess demand for good j as well
as for good i. where the former dominates the latter. In order to
offset the excess demands. the price of good j is required to increase
by more than the increase in the price of good i. The overall result is
a deterioration in the terms of trade for the country that received the
increase in monetary wealth.
"'0An increase MIl will increase the monetary wealth of the first
country while creating excess supply for the first currency. The
increase in monetary wealth will create excess demand for both goods.
As long as the first country prefers domestic goods to imported goods
then the excess demand for the first good will be greater than the
excess demand for the second good. The excess supply for the first
country will cause the exchange rate to increase thus stimulating demand
for the first good and cutting demand for the second good. The price of
the second good must increase in order to cut off the remaining demand
for the second good~ The overall effect is that PI will rise by more
than the true cost of the second good in terms of the first currency
(eP2). Thus the terms of trade deteriorated for the first country due
"'0
to the increase MIl. As long as each country prefers domestic goods to
"'0 '" 0imported goods. an increase in either Ml2 or M22 will increase the
second country's monetary wealth and cause eP2 to rise by more than Pl.
This results in a terms of trade improvement for the first country.
In contrast to the above. if each country has a perverse preference
in consumption such that each country prefers imported goods to domestic
goods. then an increase ~11 will create excess demand for the first good
and for the second good. where the latter exceeds the former. Thus the
required change in eP 2 will be larger than the change in Pl.
Consequently the terms of trade will improve for the first country.
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The adjustment process for changes in the terms of trade is similar
to the adjustment process for changes in the balance of trade. This can
be seen by inspecting equations (27) and (29). An increase ~ll will
create excess supply for the first currency as well as excess demand for
both goods. This situation will cause the exchange rate to increase.
resulting in a balance of trade deficit and a deterioration of the terms
of trade for the first country. The determination of the change in the
balance of trade is independent of the "crucial ratios··. Therefore it
"'0is possible to have an increase MIl resulting in a balance of trade
deficit. along with a terms of trade improvement. This result is
feasible as long as each country has perverse preferences for the
consumption of goods.
"'0
The reason that an equi-proportionate increase in Mil or decrease
AO •Mi2 deter1.orates the terms of trade for the first country by the same
magnitude. is due to the homogeneity conditions as well as the symmetry
'" 0 "'0
of the model for changes in Mil and Mi2. This is similar to changes in
A '"
the balance of trade from changes in Mil and Mi2.
If all holders of M~ increased their holdings by the same1
proportion.
will provide the following result:
A A
t t
-=-=0
"0 "'0
M1* M2*
Thus there is no terms of trade effect due to monetary forces. which is
consistent with the earlier work of the Monetarists.
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VII. The Fixed Exchange late Regime
This section investigates the effects of monetary policy and
exchange rate devaluations in determining the direction of change in the
prices. the balance of trade. and the terms of trade under a fixed
,
exchange rate regime. As in the work by Kemp (1970). it is assumed that
a supra-national exchange authority intervenes in the currency markets
to maintain the rate of exchange at the level agreed upon by the two
governments. Although this is an oversimplification of the situation. it
is incorporated into this study to make the results compatible with
those obtained by Hahn (1959) and Kemp (1979).
The assumption of a supra-national authority implies that the
currency markets as described by equations (9) and (10) are no longer
required to be in equilibrium. It is the responsibility of the exchange
authority to supply or demand currency in order to maintain equilibrium
in the currency markets. The model for the fixed exchange rate regime
now consists of equations (12.1). (13.1). and (C.4) which are shown
below and are dependent upon the homogeneity conditions of (12.2).
(13.2). and (26). Equation (C.4) is equation (25) written in terms of
A
percentage changes. The model will determine Pl. P2 and dB.
(12.1)
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(13.1)
dB=
(C.4)
The following propositions can be deduced from the fixed exchange rate
model.
L.l. Prices
PROPOSITION ~ A proportionate devaluation of the exchange rate will
inflate the first country's price level by a less than proportionate
amount. and will deflate the second country's price level by a less than
proportionate amount. Furthermore. a proportionate expansion of any
currency M? will inflate all price levels by a less than proportionateI~J
amount.
A
Proof: The reduced form equations for PI and P2 are shown by equations
(A.3) and (A.I) respectively. Substituting simpler notation will produce
the following equations, where Aij and Wij represent the appropriate set
of coefficients:
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(31)
( 32)
A proportionate devaluation of the first country's currency (an
increase in e) will increase the monetary wealth of both countries by a
less than proportionate amount. Referring to equations (12) and (13). it
is observed that this will create excess demand for the first good
requiring a less than proportionate increase in PI in order to maintain
an equilibrium. The increase in both country's nominal monetary wealth
and the overwhe lming price effect due to the increase in the exchange
rate will initially create excess supply for the second good.
Therefore. the price of the second good is required to decline in order
to stimulate demand to establish a new equilibrium.
A proportionate increase M~1 will increase the monetary wealth of
the first country which will create excess demand for both goods. Since
the exchange rate is inflexible. both prices are required to rise by a
less than proportionate amount to suppress demand and establish a new
equilibrium for both goods. For the fixed exchange rate regime. prices
have full responsibility for maintaining an equilibrium in both
commodity markets. Consequently both prices must rise as a result of an
"'0increase in any Mij.
2AZ Balance gf Trade
PROPOSITION ~ The direction of change of the balance of trade is
dependent upon the relative rate of change of the monetary wealth of
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each country. Furthermore. a devaluation will create a balance of trade
surplus (deficit) for the home country as long as each country holds a
majority of its wealth in its own (other) currency.
dB a !. MWoMWo [MwO _ Mw° +(~1 _ Miz ) e]
r 1 Z Z 1 'uuO °
nW1 MWZ
Proof: See Appendix E
An increase in the first country's monetary wealth caused by an
""0increase MIl will create excess supply for the first currency held by
the first country. excess demand for the second currency held by the
first country. and excess demand for both commodities. Due to the
homogeneity conditions. the required change in the two prices. and the
inflexibility of the exchange rate. the excess supply for the first
currency held by the first country will dominate the excess demand for
the second currency held by the first country. The overall result is a
balance of trade deficit for the first country. An increase ~I will
create excess supply for the second currency held by the first country
and excess demand for the first currency held by the first country.
where the former dominates the latter. Again. this results in a balance
of trade deficit for the first country.
An increase in either M~2 or ~~2 will cause both PI and P2 to rise.
creating excess demand for both the first currency held by the first
country and the second currency held by the first country. These excess
currency demands will unambiguously result in a balance of trade surplus
for the first country.
o
Equation (33) states that the relative magnitude of each M.. in1J
influencing the balance of trade is weighted by the share of MFij in the
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monetary wealth of country j. As the share of Mi j increases. so does the
ability of changes in Mij to influence changes in the monetary wealth of
country j. Consequently this increases the ability of changes in M~. to
1J
influence the balance of trade. This result is obtained because the
repercussion effects of the exchange rate have been eliminated. A
comparison of the results between the two exchange rate regimes will
show this explicitly. Rewriting equation (27) in order to derive the
resulting balance of trade from a change in MIl during a flexible
exchange rate regime will produce:
o (34)
which can be decomposed to:
dB dB + dB
A
=
e
< 0 (35)
"'0 "'0
'"
"'0
MIl MIl e MIlFlex Fix
With a flexible exchange rate. the exchange rate effect on the balance
"'0
of trade is dominated by the wealth effect caused by an increase MIl.
This results in a balance of trade deficit for the first country.
The direction of change in the balance of trade as a result of a
devaluation is ambiguous. and depends on the initial holdings of
currency by each country. The crucial element in determining the result
of a devaluation on the balance of trade is the relative rate of change
between the monetary wealth of each country. Since this model is written
in terms of the first currency. the value of a country's monetary wealth
that is primarily held in the second currency will be highly influenced
by changes in the exchange rate.
Equation (33) states that as long as each country holds the
majority of its wealth in its own currency. a devaluation will improve
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the balance of trade for the first country. The condition that insures
this result is:
(36)
which is the same as:
>
An increase in the exchange rate will create excess demand for the
first currency held by the first country and excess supply for the
second currency held by the first country. Given the condition that the
first country holds the majority of its wealth in the first currency.
then the excess demand for the first currency held by the first country
will dominate the excess supply for the second currency held by the
first country. Consequently. the first country will experience an
improvement in the balance of trade fro~ a devaluation.
In contrast to the above. if each country holds the majority of its
monetary wealth in the other country's currency. then an increase in the
exchange rate will cause a balance of trade deficit for the first
country. The increase in the exchange rate will create excess supply for
the second currency held by the first country and excess demand for the
first currency held by the first cpuntry. where the former dominates the
latter.
The significance of this result is that the standard gross
substitute assumption will no longer guarantee that a devaluation by any
country will improve their balance of trade. In the Currency
Substitution Model. the result of a devaluation on the balance of trade
depends on the initial holdings of currency. As an example. countries
like Isreal and early post-war Germany have approached the situation in
6S
which circulating foreign currency dominates domestic currency. Hence.
there was a possibility that a devaluation could have deteriorated their
balance of trade.
If all holders of M~
~ increased their holdings by the same
('£) "'0 .:0 A 0 A 0 " 0
proportion. such that M2* = M21 = M22 and MI* = MIl = Ml2 then equation
(E.2) produces the well known Monetarist Theorem:
dB dB dB
---=--=-
e
(38)
Although the direction of change in the balance of trade is ambiguous.
the basic relationship holds.
l..l Terms g,f Trade
PROPOSITION ~ An increas~ in the monetary wealth of the first (second)
country will deteriorate (improve) the terms of trade for the first
country as long as each country prefers domestic goods to imported
goods. Furthermore a devaluation will improve (deteriorate) the terms of
trade as long as each country holds the majority of its wealth in its
own (the other) currency. and prefers its own good.
Proof: See Appendix F.
A 0 A 0
An increase in either MIl or M21 will increase the monetary wealth
of the first country by the proportion in which MIl and M21 are held.
The increase in the monetary wealth of the first country will create
'excess demand for both goods. As long as each country prefers domestic
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goods to imported goods. the excess demand for the first good will
dominate the excess demand for the second good. The monetary wealth of
the second country remains constant due to the fixed exchange rate.
Therefore. the required change in the prices is sole ly dependent upon
"0
the excess demand caused by the increase Mil. Therefore PI is required
to increase by a greater amount than P2. result.ing in a terms of trade
deterioration for the first country.
"'0 '" 0
An increase in either M22 or M12 will increase the monetary wealth
o 0
of the second country by the proport ion that M22 and Ml2 are he ld. The
increase in the second country's monetary wealth will create excess
demand for both goods. Similar to the above. as long as each country
prefers domestic goods to imported goods. the excess demand for the
second good will dominate the excess demand for the first good.
Therefore. the required change in P2 will be greater than the change in
Pl. resulting in a terms of trade improvement for the first country.
For an expansionary monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate. the
adjustment process for the terms of trade is similar to the adjustment
process for the balance of trade. Both the balance of trade and the
terms of trade lack the secondary repercussion effects from a change in
the exchange rate. A comparison of the results of changes in the terms
of trade from an expansionary monetary policy between the two exchange
rate regimes will show this explicitly. Equation (29) can be rewritten
as:
(40)
which is decomposed to:
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(41)
As long as each country prefers domestic goods to imported goods and
maintains a flexible exchange rate. the wealth effect caused by an
• AO
~ncrease MIl will dominate the exchange rate effect. and result in a
terms of trade deterioration for the first country.
The effect of a devaluation on the terms of trade is ambiguous. and
depends directly on the initial holdings of currency. As long as each
country holds the majority of its monetary wealth in its own currency.
and prefers domestic goods to imported goods, a devaluation will improve
the terms of trade. As the exchange rate begins to rise. the monetary
wealth of the second country will increase at a faster rate than the
increase in the monetary wealth of the first country. This causes excess
demand for both goods. Since each country prefers domestic goods to
imported goods. the excess demand for the second good will be greater
then the excess demand for the first good. This requires P2 to increase
more than PI resulting in a terms of trade improvement for the first
country.
A devaluation and a monetary expansion have similar qualitative
results on the balance of trade and on the terms of trade. Given that
each country prefers domestic goods to imported goods. an increase in
the second country's monetary wealth by either a monetary expansion or
an appreciation of the second currency (e increases) will lead to a
terms of trade improvement for the first country. This result is also
accomplished through a decrease in the first country's monetary wealth.
o
If all holders of Mi increased their holdings by the same
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'" 0 '" 0proportion. such that M1* =MIl =
(F.3) will produce:
o
= M22 • then equation
"-
'" '"t t t (42)
--= - -- =
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This result is similar to the result obtained above. except that in this
case. each monetary policy instrument will change the terms of trade by
the same magnitude.
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VIII. Coaparison of the Hodel
This section compares the inflationary pressures of monetary policy
with a fixed exchange rate in a world with diversified currency holdings
to a world without diversified currency holdings. The results for the
flexible exchange rate regime have been mentioned earlier. and can be
seen by comparing the above propositions with the Monetarist Theorems.
The following propositions are derived from the fixed exchange rate
model stated above and from a compatible model lacking diversified
currency holdings.
~ Devaluation
PROPOSITION.8...:. A devaluation will be more (less) inflationary in the
home country in a world with diversified currency holdings than in a
world without diversified currency holdings, whenever the home country's
consumption preferences are more (less) sensitive to changes in monetary
wealth than the foreign country's consumpt ion preferences.
I'\.
e D
<
>
e ND
depends on:
(x~ix:P2 - x~ix~2) ~ (x:P2x~~ - X~~x~2)
Proof: See Appendix G
(44 )
A devaluation in the non-diversified model (ND) will cause the
monetary weal th of the second country to increase. while the monetary
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wealth of the first country remains constant. The increased monetary
wealth of the second country will create excess demand for both goods.
requiring a rise in the prices of both goods.
A proportionate devaluation in the diversified model (D) will cause
the mone tary wea I th of bot h coun tr ie s to ri se by a Ie s s th'en
proportionate amount. The second country's monetary wealth will
increase more in the ND model than in the D model. Thus its effect on
PI will be smaller in the D model than in the ND model. The first
country's monetary wealth remained constant in the ND model and rose
slightly in the D model. Thus its effect on PI is zero in the ND model
ant\ positive in the D model. Consequent ly. the significant factor in
determining the amount of change in PI between the two models is whether
the relatively large change in the second country's monetary wealth for
the ND model will create a greater amount of excess demand for the first
good compared to the combined yet relatively smaller changes in both
country's monetary wealth in the D model.
Equation (44) shows that the signif,icant elements in determining
the amount of change in PI between the two models are the specific
consumption preferences between the two countries. Sufficient
conditions for the ND model to be more inflationary than the D model
are:
(45)
(46)
These state that the first country will consume very little of its
increase in monetary wealth. and that the second country will consume a
large proportion of its increase in monetary wealth. Therefore. the
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increase in PI is caused primarily by the excess demand created by the
increase in the second country's monetary wealth. Since a devaluation
will cause the second country's monetary wealth to increase more in the
ND model than in the D model. the inflationary pressures on PI will be
larger in the ND model than in the D model.
In contrast to the above. if the first country's consumption
patterns are highly sensitive to increases in monetary wealth. then a
devaluation will be more inflationary to the home country in the D model
than in the ND model. A devaluation will increase the monetary wealth
of both countries creating excess demand for both goods. An increase in
the marginal propensity to consume by the first country will create
additional excess demand for the first good. The overall effect is that
PI is required to increase more in the D model than in the ND model.
~ Money Creation
PROPOSITION iL For both a diversified and non-diversified world. a
proportionate increase in the home country's monetary wealth will
produce the same but less than proportionate increase in the home
country's price level.
Proof: Using the same sufficient conditions and common denominators as
Appendix G. the elasticities become:
A
A ..... 0
PI PI lJi l MWI (47)= -- =
lJilMWi + IPZMWZA 0 A 0MWI MWID ND
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The ND model implies that the increase in monetary wealth must have
been caused by an increase in the first currency. The D model implies
that the increase in monetary wealth could have been caused by either an
increase in the first currency or the second currency. or both. A
proportionate increase in the first currency for both models implies a
greater increase in monetary wealth in the ND model than in the D model.
Consequently. the inflationary pressures will be greater in the ND
model. This is evident because the initial holdings of the first
currency differs between models.
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I~ The Longrun Currency Substitution Hodel
This section investigates a stationary state with full stock
equilibrium for a flexible exchange rate regime. It is assumed that the
world money supp ly is fixed. and that the hoarding of currency by any
country will be at the expense of the other country. Stated
differently. Ml=Mll+M12 and M2=M21 +M22' where each Mi is exogenous. A
full stock equilibrium implies that all M.. 's are equal to M? .'s
1J 1J
throughout the analysis. Given a full stock equilibrium and the fact
that the world money supplies are exogenous each Mlj become endogenous.
~ Stationary~
The investigation of the longrun properties of the Currency
Substitution "Model for changes in the world's money supply involves the
conditions stated above along with the equilibrium conditions for the
currencies and goods markets. The following seven equation model is
used to determine:
0
° X12 (P1 ,eP 2,eM;2 + Mi2) (48)Xl = X11(PI,ePZ,MIl + eM21) +
X2 = X21 ( ) + X22 ( ) (49)
° + Mi2 MII ( ) + M12 ( ) (50)MIl =
Mil = MII ( ) (51)
eM;2 = M22(Pl,eP2,eM~2 + Mi2 ) (52)
Mi = Mil + Mi2 (53)
eM o ° ° (54)= eM22 + eMZ12
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Using equations (53) and (54) to solve for M~2 and M~l respectively. and
then substituting them into equations (48)-(52) yields the following
Xl = Xl1(PI,eP2,Mil,eMZ eM;2) + XI2(P1,eP2,eM~2,Mi Mil) (55)
X2 = X21 ( ) + X22 ( ) (56)
-0 MII ( ) + M12 ( ) (57)MI =
0 MII ( ) (58)MIl =
0 M22(PI,eP2,eM;2,M~ M~l) (59)eM22 =
Solving the model for the endogenous variables yield the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION ~ The Currency Substitution Model with a stationary
state. full stock equilibrium results in all of the Monetarist Theorems.
"" ""Proof: Solving the model for 0 0 yields the following:M22 and Mil
'" "'0-0 "'0 ""0MI = MIl = M12 = MI *
(60)
(61)
(See Appendix H)
Incorporating equations (60) and (61) into the Propositions 1 - 4
produces the Monetarist Theorems.
The significance of this result is that the standard Monetarist
Theorems become the longrun solutions for the Currency Substitution
Model. Although the Monetarist Theorems break down in the shortrun. they
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do provide an explanation of the longrun adjustment process.
A proportionate increase M~ will initially create excess demand for
both goods along with excess supply for the first currency and excess
demand for the second currency. The homogeneity restrictions with a
full stock equilibrium imply that a proportionate increase in both the
prices of the first good and the exchange rate will maintain
equilibrium in the market for both goods.
-0
A proportionate increase M2 will initially create excess demand for
both goods along with excess supply for the second currency and excess
demand for the first currency. A full stock equilibrium and the
homogeneity restrictions imply that a proportionate increase in the
price of the second currency and a proportionate decrease in the
exchange rate will maintain both goods markets in equilibrium.
Consequently. a proportionate -0increase Mi will cause a
proportionate change in Pi and e. The price of the other good is not
required to change. resulting in the familar Monetarist Theorems.
~ Stability ~ ~ Specie~ Mechanism
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if the specie flow
mechanism for the Currency Substitution Model is stable. The test for
stability of the model involves determining whether an increase in the
flow of currency will decrease the excess demand for currency.
The reduced form equations for prices and the exchange rate
produced by the Currency Substitution Kodel in the shortrun were:
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(17)
(18)
(15)
Equations (17) and (18) are homogeneous of degree one in the M~ -'s.
l.J
and equation (15) is homogeneous of degree zero in the Mij's.
The flow of currency through time can be written in terms of the
excess demand equations:
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
These equations are homogeneous of degree one in their arguments.
Substituting equations (15). (17) and (18) into equations '(62)-(65)
produces excess demand equations that are homogeneous of degree one in
o
the Mij's. This four equation system written in percentage changes and
evaluated about a stationary equilibrium can be written as:
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~1 MO ~leMo ~1 MO ~leMo '" dEll
11 11 l 22 22 12 12 21 21 Mil
~2 MO ~2eMo ~2 MO E22 eM° '" dE22
11 11 22 22 22 12 M21 21
MZ2 (66)=
~2 MO E12eM° ~2 MO E12e}1° '" dE12
11 11 M22 22 12 12 M21 21
Mi2
~1 MO 21 ° E21 MO ~leMO '" dE21
11 11 EM eM22 M12 12 21 21
Mil
22
where:
dE ••
= ----!l
aM~.
1.J
For all i,j
Since the equations are homogeneous of degree one and evaluated
about a stationary equilibrium. the row sums of the matrix in equation
(66) are zero. A stationary state with the world money supplies fixed
implies:
Substituting equations (67) and (68) into (66) yields:
=
78
(68)
Proposition ~ If assets are assumed to follow a reduced-form-gross-
substitutes pattern. then the specie flow mechanism of the Currency
Substitution Model will have a stable equilibrium. If assets are not
assumed to follow a reduced-form-gross-substitutes pattern. then the
stability of the specie flow mechanism becomes ambiguous. and dependent
on the initial holdings of wealth. the individual consumption
preferences and the sensitivity of consumption to changes in income for
each country.
Proof: See Appendix I
By letting the matrix in (66) follow a reduced-form-gross-
substitutes pattern implies that the diagonal elements are negative and
the off-diagonal elements are positive. The stability of the specie
flow mechanism for the Currency Substitution Model with such a pattern
is apparent. It implies that regardless of the direction of change of
currencies. the direction of change of currency i will dominate the
direction of change in the excess demand for currency i. The
restrictions imposed by equations (67) and (68) do not change this
result.
However. if assets don't follow a reduced-form-gross-substitutes
pattern. it can not be guaranteed that the flow of currency i will
dominate the direction of change in the excess demand for currency i.
The diagonal elements of the matrix in (69) are still negative. but the
row sums as shown below are ambiguous in sign.
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P1 [ MO MO ] eP2 [ Mo MO JM11P1 (81-1) 1 82 M; (Y1-<I>l-1) ~2 + M~lMi2 - + MIl eP2 (Y2-cP 2)21
II
[(<1>1-1)
MO
Mo ]+ M11eMZ1 1 4>2 M~ ('TO)~-M12 21
Consequently. the matrix in equation (69) may not have negative
dominant diagonal elements. and the stability of the system is not
guaranteed.
The inspection of equations (70) and (71) demonstrates the
counteracting forces in the economy that will not guarantee the
stability of the system. One can observe that the last two elements of
equations (70) and (71) represent the income effect from a change in
o
Hij • These elements are both negative. and therefore are working towards
the stability of the system.
However. the set of coefficients corresponding to the price effects
for both equations are ambiguous. This ambiguity is caused by two
factors. The first factor is the cross currency holdings between
countries. These initial currency holdings will determine the relative
rate of change of the monetary wealth between countries from a change in
o
the Mij's. The relative rate of change of monetary weal th between the
two countries will help to deter~ine the direction of change in the
price levels. and therefore the direction of change in the excess demand
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for currency i. Thus, the initial levels of currency play a significant
role in determining the stability of the system.
The second factor, which further complicates the situation, is the
ambiguous price elasticities (ie. 82 , Y1 ) which appear in equations (70)
and (71). These ambiguous price elasticities demonstrate that regardless
of the relative rate of change between the two monetary wealths, which
are themselves ambiguous. the direction of change in the price levels
are also ambiguous. Tpis economic phenomenon was explained in
Proposition 2, where it was concluded that the overall result is
dependent on the consumption preferences for each country as well as on
the sensitivity of consumption to changes in income for each country.
Therefore. since the model can not determine the relative rate of
change in monetary wealth between the two countries. or their effect on
the change in the price levels. then the direction of change of the
excess demands will be ambiguous. Consequently. the stability of the
specie flow mechanism in the Currency Substitution Model depends on
three counteracting forces: 1. the relative rate of change in the
monetary wealth between.the two countries. 2. the individual consumption
preferences of each country and 3. the sensitiv:ity of consumption to
changes in income for each country.
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The propositions stated above for the flexible exchange rate regime
show that the rate of change of the exchange rate and the rate of change
of the two price levels are determined by the relative rate of change of
each currency supply. Specifically, an equi-proportionate increase in
the first currency or decrease in the second currency will cause the
exchange rate to fall by a less than proportionate amount. The
importation of inflation to the home country from a foreign monetary
expansion was shown to be ambiguous, and dependent on the rate of change
of the exchange rate, as well as on the consumption patterns for both
countries. The balance of trade and the terms of trade were shown to be
determined by the distribution of currencies between the two countries.
In addition, if each country has perverse preferences for consumption.
then a deterioration of the terms of trade need not be associated with a
balance of trade deficit.
The propositions previously stated for the fixed exchange rate
regime show that a monetary expansion of any currency will inflate both
price levels, and that the gross substitute assumption does not
guarantee that a devaluation will improve the balance of trade. The
balance of trade and the terms of trade were shown to be determined by
the distribution of currencies between the two countries. The overall
result of a devaluation on the balance of trade and the terms of trade
is ambiguous and depends on the initial holdings of currency.
A comparison of the inflationary pressures from a devaluation
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between a world with diversified currency holdings and a world without
•
diversified currency holdings demonstrated that the overall result
depends directly on the sensitivity of the home country's consumption
patterns to fluctuations in the exchange rate. In addition. it was
concluded that the Monetarist Theorems are appropriate for explaining
the international adjustment process in the longrun.
~ Siinificance ~ ~ Results
The results obtained for the flexible exchange rate regime are
consistent with the results obtained from other Currency Substitution
Models. specifically those by Chen (1973). Both this model and Chen's
conclude that the effectiveness of changes in monetary policy on
changes in the exchange rate. prices and the balance of trade yield
results that fall between the traditional flexible exchange rate regime
and the traditional fixed exchange rate regime. Both models stress that
the balance of trade need not remain unchanged from changes in the money
supplies. Although the two models yield compatible results. this model
amplifies the substitution and income effects in determining these
results. which yields additional insights for determining the
importation of inflation to the home country from foreign monetary
policy.
There is extensive empirical evidence in the literature showing the
failure of the Purchasing Power Parity Hypoth~sis. While there are
several theoretical reasons for this behavior. this model provides an
alternative explanation. Although the substitutibility of international
currency may not be the only reason for this economic phenomenon. it
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does yield an additional explanation for this failure.
Nowhere in the literature has one attempted to investigate the
internat iona I adjustment proce ss with divers ified currency holdings
during a fixed exchange rate regime. Miles (1978) has empirically
investigated the situation between Canada and the U.S•• but no one has
investigated the macroeconomic implications of such a case. The
conclusion reached in this study for the importation of inflation is
consistent with the conclusion reached by traditional models. in that a
fixed exchange rate will expose the domestic country to foreign
inflation. However. the conclusion that a devaluation will have an
ambiguous result on the terms of trade and on the balance of trade • is
in itself unique. It demonstrates the counteracting forces in the
economy which can lead to perverse results. This could act as a
catalyst for future investigation of the economic behavior of a small
open economy that is compelled to hold large quantities of foreign
currency.
In addition, this model has shown that in the short run. the
Monetarist Theorems as shown by Hahn (1959) and Kemp (1970), are at best
special cases of the Currency Substitution Model. The homogeneity of
the system breaks down with the introduction of crosS currency holdings.
such that a proportionate change in the money supplies will cause a less
than proportionate change in the endogenous variables. However. this
model amplifies the robustness of the Monetarist Theorems in explaining
longrun behavior. In conclusion. this study has placed the relevant
economic literature into proper-perspective for explaining both the
shortrun and longrun behavior of the international economy.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Lemma AI: o
Proof: Homogeneity conditions imply that
hence:
Q.E.D.
Proof: Using the demand for MIl as an example, the homogeneity
restrictions imply that:
'"Substituting equation (12.1) into (13.1) for P1Pl , and solving for
A
P2 will yield:
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Q.E.D.
where: r2l
. ( PI II II PI )
X2 XII X2lX1 > 0
r22
( PI I Z I Z PI)X2 X12 - X22X1 > 0
~ ( ePZ PI ePZ PI) > 0 (by Lemma 1)= X2 Xl - Xl X2
(A.I)
Using the same procedure with the homogeneity restrictions, equations
(12.2) and (13.2) yield:
(A.2)
Substituting (A.1) for P2 into equation (12.2) yields:
where:
(A.3)
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Substituting (A.2) into (12.2) for eP2 yields the homogeneity
restrictions:
(A.4)
In order to obtain the reduced form equation for ~, substitute equations
(A.l) and (A.3) into equation (14.1) for PI and P
2
.
(A.5)
Using the same procedure with equations (A.2), (A.4) and (14.2) yields
the homogeneity restrictions:
(A.6)
Rewriting equation (A.S) with the information contained in (A.6) yields:
e =
(A.7)
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Rewriting equation (A.7) with simpler notation, where each a .. represents
~J
the appropriate set of coefficients for each M~.:
~J
(A.B)
By inspection, a Zl and a ZZ are unambiguously positive in sign, and all
and al2 are ambiguous in sign. In order to determine the signs to all
and a lZ ' additional investigation is required.
The four equilibrium conditions stated above (7) - (10) along with
the world's budget constraint (11) demonstrate the interdependence of
the equations. This allows one to incorporate Walras' Law, and use the
three equation system (lZ) - (14) dependent upon the world's budget
constraint (11).
An alternative approach for deriving the interior restrictions of
the model is to use the four equilibrium conditions directly, and disre-
gard the world's budget constraint. In this model, this approach is a
more direct procedure for deriving the interior restrictions of the
model.
This approach calls for the resurrection of equation (10). After
substituting in the appropriate demand equations, one can derive the
corresponding equation for percentage changes' along with the homo-
geneity restrictions. By the substitution of equations (A.I) and (A.3)
for Pz and PI into the equation for the percentage changes, along with
the substitution of (A.Z) and (A.4) for PI and Pz into the homogeneity
A
restrictions, another reduced form equation for e will be obtained.
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[(l-M1Z ) 6-M
P
Ill, _ eP2 ] 0 [( 12 ) PI eP2 ] 022 2 0/1 M2 Ql eM2l + l-M22 6-M2 1P 2- M2 Q2 eM22
(A.9)
Rewriting equation (A.9) with simpler notation, where each b .. represents
1.)
the appropriate set of coefficients for each M~.:
1.J
(A.lO)
where bll and b12 are unambiguously positive in sign, and b2l and b Z2
are ambiguous in sign. Therefore, the interior restrictions on the
model are: all = bll , a12 = b12 , a2l = b 2l , and a 22 = b 22 . Conse-
quently, one can derive an expression for ~ with the unambiguous
elements of equations CA.7) and (A.9):
A
e =
(A.ll)
By inspecting equation (A.ll), one can observe that the set of coeffi-
cients corresponding to M~l and M~Z must sum to one, and the coefficients
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~o ~o
corresponding to M22 and M2I must sum to negative one. Consequently,
equation (A. II) may be rewritten, where each ¢. represents the appropriate
1
set of coefficients.
e =
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~.12)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
'"To solve for PI' substitute (A.12) into (A.3) for e:
[ 1/IZM~Z + 1/11 (1-</>1) eM;l + 1/IZ (1-</>1) eM;z] AO
+ ~Pl Ml2
+ [1/11</>ZeM;l - 1/IZ (l-</>Z) eM;z] A 0~PI M~l
[ 1/IZ (l-</>Z) eM;Z - 1/11</>zeM2J A C
+ DoP
1
M22
where ~PI is the expression in (A.4).
(B .1)
"'0 "'0The set of parameters for MIl and M12 are both positive, and sum
'" '"to one. The set of parameters for M~l and M~2 are indeterminate in
sign, and sum to zero. Therefore, equation (B.l) can be rewritten as:.
(B.2)
"'0
where 81 represents the set of parameters corresponding to MIl' and 82
"'0
represents the set of parameters corresponding to M2l •
The expression for 81 can be written as:
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Therefore, it can be concluded that 0 < 81 < 1, and that 82 is
ambiguous in sign.
To solve for P2' substitute (A.12) into (A.I) for e, and use (A.2)
to simplify the numerator:
A [(l-<Pl)rllM~l - <PlrlzM~zJ A
P2 = 0
~eP2 MIl
+
[ <P1rlZ'\Z - (l-<Pl)rllM~lJ
"0Ml2~eP2
[ rl1 (eM;l + (1-¢2)M~1) + (l-<PZ)rlZM~Z ]
+ "'0
~eP2
M21
[ 0 0 <PZM~Z) ]¢2MIIQI + Q2(eM22 +
+
"'0 (B.3)
~eP2
M22
"'0 "'0The set of parameters for M21 and M22 are both positive, and sum to one.
"0 "'0The set of parameters for MIl and Ml2 are indeterminate in sign, and
sum to zero. Equation (B.3) is rewritten with simpler notation:
(B.4)
"'0
where YI represents the set of coefficients corresponding to MIl' and
"'0Y2 represents the sets of coefficients corresponding to M22 . The
expression for Y2 can be written as:
"'(2 =
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Therefore, it can be concluded that 0 < Y2 < 1, and that Y
l
is ambiguous
in sign.
In order to investigate the elasticity between PI and M;2 (-8 2),
substitute ¢2 from equation (A.ll) into equation (B.l). Written below
is the numerator for -8 2, which is ambiguous in sign. The denominator
is composed of the denominators for ¢2 and 82 , which is positive and
not shown.
(B.5)
which can also be written as:
-8
. 2
(B.6)
"" ""0In order to investigate the elasticity between P2 and MIl (Yl ) , substi-
tute ¢l from equation (A.ll) into equation (B.3). Written below is the
numerator for Yl , which is ambiguous in sign. The denominator is com-
posed of the denominators for ¢l and Yl , which is positive and not shown.
(B,7)
which can be written as:
(B.8)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
With the initial balance of trade equal to zero, equation (26)
implies:
which further implies:
(1 - M~i) I> M 121
and
(1- M~i) I> M 111
> 0 (C.l)
(C.2)
(C.3)
Taking the percentage changes of equation (25) results in:
(C.4)
Substituting in for e, PI and P2 with the aid of equations (15),
(17) and (18) results in a reduced form equation for dB:
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(C.5)
With the aid of equation (Z6), equation (C.S) can be simplified to:
(C.6)
where nl is the set of coefficients corresponding to M~2 and nZ is the
set of coefficients corresponding to MZ2 ' Equation (C.6) can be
rewritten as:
(C.7)
In order to determine the signs of nl and nZ' substitute 8i and Yi
from equations (17) and (18) into equation (C.S) in order to obtain:
(C.8)
(C.9)
where:
1T =
(C.lO)
o 0) 0 n 0) > 0r = (WlMW1 + lP2MWZ (nlMWl + ZMWZ
MW o 0 0= MIl + eMZl1
MW o 0 0= eMZ2 + M12Z
(C.ll)
(C .12)
(C.13)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The terms of trade ( t) for the first country is defined to be:
PI
(D .1)t =-
ePZ
The percentage change of (D.I) is:
(D.2)
Substituting ~, PI and Pz into equation (D.2) from equations (15), (17)
and (18) yields:
Substituting for y. and 8. from equations (17) and (18) yields:
1. 1.
(D.3)
(D.4)
where
(D.5)
(D.6)
CD.7)
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(D.B)
where
~l and ~Z are both positive as long as:
or
(D.9)
> (D.I0)
To determine the size of ~l' expand both the numerator and the denomina-
tor in equation (D.S), and then add and subtract (l-~l)eM;IMW;~lnZ and
¢leM;2MW~~lnZ to the numerator in order to obtain:
where
(D. II)
~l = Q1WZ [(1-$1)Mi1MW; + $lM~ZMW~]
+ W1QZ [$leM;ZMW~ + (l-$l)eM;lMW;] > a (D .1Z)
(D.13)
Hence, ~l must be less than one in absolute size. To determine the
size of SZ, expand both the numerator and the denominator in equation
to the numerator in order to obtain:
where
Hence, ~2 must be less than one in absolute size.
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(D.14)
(D.1S)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
A
Substitute equations (31) and (32) into equation (C.B) for PI and
"P2 in order to obtain:
To simplify the above, substitute for each A.. and w.. using
~J ~J
equations (A.l) and (A.3).
where
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(E .1)
(E.2)
'IT = (E.3)
It can be shown that:
Hence, equation (E.2) can be rewritten as:
Since
and
then equation (E.4) can be rewritten as:
[
MO MO ]
'IT ° 0 MWA 0 MWA 0 +(11 12 ) AedB=-MWMW - ---r 1 2 2 1 MWo MW o
1 2
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(E.4)
(E .5)
(E.6)
(E.7)
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
The percentage change of the terms of trade is defined as:
A A
Substituting equations (31) and (32) into (F.l) for PI and P2 will
produce:
(F .1)
'"t =
(F.2)
Substituting for each A•• and w.. in equation (F.2) with the aid of
1.J 1.J
equations (A.l), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) will produce:
Equation (F.3) can be further simplified to:
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(F.3)
(F.4)
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
To compare the relative effects of a devaluation on the price level
between the two models, it is necessary to determine the relative size
between the following elasticities:
e D
<
>
e ND
(G.l)
where D denotes the diversified currency model, and ND denotes the non-
diversified currency model. The elasticity for the ND model is obtained
from a model similar to the model used above, with the added restriction
that monetary wealth j is equal to M~.
J
Substituting the appropriate elasticities into (G.l) yields:
where:
wleM;l + ~2eM;2
~Pl
<
>
-~l
(G.2)
(G.3)
(G.4)
To compare the two elasticities, it is necessary that both models
begin with the same amount of monetary wealth, as well as the same
initial value for the price of the first good. To insure both of these
conditions, it is sufficient to set both denominators equal to each
other in order to obtain:
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(G.5)
(G.6)
Consequently, the sufficient conditions are:
(G.7)
(G.8)
With common denominators, the relative size between the two elasticities
rely solely on the numerators.
(G.9)
Imposing the sufficient conditions, equation (G.8) becomes:
(G.lD)
which reduces to:
(G.Il)
o 0In an open economy with fixed exchange rates, eM2l = Ml2 . Imposing
this information as well as substituting for each ~. in equation
1.
(G.Il) produces:
(G.l2)
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
Equations (55) - (59) are used to derive both the homogeneity
restrictions for the model, as well as the equations for the percentage
changes. Using the equations for the percentage changes, the model can
be solved in order to eliminate Mil and M~2 to yield a three equation
model in terms of PI' P2 and e .
(H.I)
(H.2)
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(H.3)
where
(H04)
(H 05)
(Ho 6)
"'-Equations (HoI) and (HoZ) are used to derive the equations for PI
A A
A A
and Pz in terms of Mi, M~ and e
A A
alePZP Z = azMiMi + a3eM~M; + (a3eMZ - blePZ)~
where
(Ho 7)
(HoB)
li (II I Z) ( p.1 ePZ ePZ PI) ( II 1 Z) ( PI ePZ PI epz )]a l = S~ + XZ1-XZZ Xl ~ -Xl ~ + x11-xlZ ~ Xz -XZ ~
(H09)
a 3 = [(I-M~; )Q1 - ~iQ2 + r,P1KJ
hI = [(I-M~i ) W2 - M~;Wl + r,eP2K]
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.\
..'
(HolD)
(H. 11)
(H .1Z)
(H.13)
(HoI4)
Substituting equations (H.7) and (H.8) into (H.3) results in the reduced
form equation for e:
(H .15)
The homogeneity restrictions on the model imply that:
(H .16)
Therefore, equation (H. 15) with the aid of equation (H.16) will
reduce to:
(H .17)
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Substituting (Ho17) into (H07) for ~ yields:
(Ho18)
where the homogeneity restrictions are:
(H 019)
Hence, equation (HolB) produces the result:
Substituting (Ho17) into (HoB) yields:
(H02D)
A
al eP 2)Mi + (a3MZ- a3MZ+ aleP2)M~ (H02l)
where the homogeneity restrictions are:
Hence, equation (H02l) produces the result:
(Ho 22)
(H 023)
Rewriting equations (5B) and (59) in terms of percentage changes, and
then substituting in equations (Ho17), (H020) and (H023) for PI' P2 and
'" for "'0 "'0 yields:e, then solving MIl and M22
A
"0 -0
MIl = Ml
'""'0 -0M22 = M2
(H 0 24)
(H 0 25)
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These equations, along with equations (53) and (54), imply:
A
-0 "'0 "'0 "0 (H.Z6)MI = MIl = MIZ = MI *
A
-0 "'0 "0 "0 (H .'Z7)M2 = M21 = MZ2 = MZ*
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
By letting the matrix in (66) follow a reduced-form-gross-
substitutes pattern implies that the diagonal elements are negative,
and the off-diagonal elements are positive. Since the row sums of the
matrix are zero, it can be stated:
IRll MO I > R~leM° RII MO ElleM°~ll 11 IMZI Zl' IMIZ 12' IMZZ 22 (1.1)
(1.2)
Substituting equations (67) and (68) for Miz and M;l into the first two
rows of the matrix in equation (66) yields a two equation system written
"0 "0in terms of MIl and MZZ .
=
(I.3)
A sufficient but not necessary condition for the system of equation (1.3)
to be stable is negative eigenvalues. In other words, a negative
dominant diagonal matrix.
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The elements of the matrix in equation (1.3) can be derived by
substituting equations (15), (17) and (18) into equations (62) and (63).
The diagonal elements are:
22 22 0 M~2EM eM° - EM eM2l MO =22 22 21 21
where:
The off-diagonal elements are:
III
(1.6)
(1.7)
The row sum for the first row is:
(1.8)
Equation (1.1) showed that IRII MO I~ll 11 11 0> EM eM22 ; therefore, equation22
(1.8) has a negative row sum. This technique will also prove that the
second row will have a negative row sum. Consequently, the matrix in
equation (1.3) has negative dominant diagonal elements, and therefore
has a stable equilibrium.
If the reduced-form-gross-substitutes pattern is not imposed, then
the row sums for the matrix in equation (1.3) are:
(1.9)
where 82 , Y2-¢2' 8l -¢1' Yl are ambiguous in sign. Therefore, equations
(1.9) and (1.10) are ambiguous in sign.
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